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I. INTRODUCTION1
Nestled in its own corner of American Indian law, the White Mountain Apache v. Bracker2
balancing test, also known as implied federal preemption, and its progeny have shaped the
application of state tax laws within tribal lands for four decades.3 Under this test, a court balances
federal, tribal, and state interests to determine whether a state’s taxing authority is impliedly
preempted by federal law.4 The Bracker balancing test is confined to state assertions of authority
“over the conduct of non-Indians engaging in activity on the reservation.”5 In a recent dissent,
Chief Justice Roberts described the Bracker balancing test as “a nebulous balancing test,” which
lacks rigidity and “mires state efforts to regulate on reservation lands in significant uncertainty,
guaranteeing that many efforts will be deemed permissible only after extensive litigation, if at
all.”6 Put simply, the present iteration of the Bracker balancing test is unworkable.
This Article argues that the Bracker balancing test, in its current form, does not produce
predictable outcomes. By examining decisions in which a court conducted the Bracker balancing
test, we conclude that the test fails to provide clear guidance of its application, thus seeding
unpredictability for tribes, states, and enterprises conducting business with tribes. We argue that
after forty years, the Bracker balancing test must be remodeled to provide sorely needed clarity.
Such a position is not, in and of itself, groundbreaking. Many tribal scholars have criticized the
current Herculean task litigants face when Bracker is at issue and the resulting uncertainty for
states, tribes, and tribal business partners.7 This Article departs from prior scholarship by
examining data from lower federal and state court decisions. We analyze lower courts’ application
of the Bracker balancing test since the test’s inception to identify how the lack of clarity has
manifested in litigated controversies.
“The power to tax is a fundamental, necessary sovereign power of government.”8 But
identifying which sovereigns wield taxing powers in particular scenarios has produced decades of
448 U.S. 136 (1980) (hereinafter “Bracker”).
Although the Bracker balancing test has been employed for a variety of state assertions of authority, see generally,
e.g., New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324 (1983) (rejecting the state’s attempt to regulate a tribe’s
game hunting enterprise), this Article focuses solely on state taxation authority because most of the cases that
conduct the Bracker balancing test address state taxing power.
4
Bracker, 448 U.S. at 142-45.
5
Id. at 144.
6
McGirt v. Oklahoma, 521 U.S. __, 140 S.Ct. 2452, 2501 (2020) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
7
Alex Tallchief Skibine, From Foundational Law to Limiting Principles in Federal Indian Law, 80 MONT. L. REV.
67, 89-97 (2019); Anthony Broadman, How I Learned To Stop Worrying and Love Bracker, GALANDA BROADMAN
(Aug. 14, 2013), https://www.galandabroadman.com/blog/2013/08/how-i-stopped-worrying-and-learned-to-lovebracker [https://perma.cc/3L25-WX6A] (“[I]t seems every time courts apply the Bracker balancing test, it becomes
erroneously less possible to pass.”); F. Michael Willis, Courts Side with Tribes in the First Tax Disputes Testing the
Obama Administration Land Leasing Regulations, NATIVE AM. RESOURCE COMMITTEE (2016),
https://www.hobbsstraus.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Michael-Willis-State-Taxation-and-the-Indian-LandLeasing-Regulations.pdf [https://perma.cc/FU2Y-38V8] (“Administering [the Bracker balancing test] adds a layer of
legal uncertainty to an already challenging environment for economic development. . . . The result has been the loss
of tribally generated revenues to those outside jurisdictions, legal uncertainty that stifles economic development in
tribal communities, and frequent resort to litigation.”); John Hayden Dossett, Indian Country and the Territory
Clause: Washington’s Promise at the Framing, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 205, 274-75 (2018).
8
Elster v. City of Seattle, 444 P.3d 590 (2019).
2
3
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inconsistent outcomes in the lower courts.9 States’ power to tax certain enterprises or activities on
tribal lands potentially conflicts with the federal government’s interests in promoting tribal
sovereignty and self-governance. The conditions under which state taxes are preempted by the
Bracker balancing test remain unclear. The disparate outcomes in recent gaming cases are
illustrative of such disparities.
Many tribes own and operate gaming facilities.10 Instead of purchasing their own gaming
equipment, some tribes lease equipment from non-Indian corporations.11 Some states have
imposed ad valorem, or personal property, taxes on the non-Indian’s gaming equipment even
though it is located only within tribal boundaries.12 When a state asserts taxation authority over a
non-Indian on tribal land, the Bracker balancing test applies.13 Employing the Bracker balancing
test, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the state tax on the gaming equipment was preempted
by federal law.14 Yet, the Second Circuit upheld the equivalent tax imposed by the State of
Connecticut.15 Both courts applied the same test to like taxes on gaming equipment. Yet, the courts
reached opposite results.16
In October 2020, the Supreme Court had the occasion to review this Oklahoma Supreme
Court decision, but denied certiorari.17 Justice Thomas dissented from this denial, arguing that the
opposite holdings in the Oklahoma and Second Circuit decisions presented a “square conflict.”18
He recognized that the Court had “an opportunity to clear up tensions among courts about how to
apply pre-emption principles at the intersection of federal law, state law, and tribal land.”19 But
with the denial of certiorari, “pre-emption law will remain amorphous.”20 Justice Thomas’s
frustration with the denial puts him in good company.
Many scholars lament how the Bracker balancing test has evolved from its original
meaning.21 Several commentators have called on Congress fix the problem.22 Instead of adopting
9

See infra Part IV.
Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Town of Ledyard, 722 F.3d 457 (2d Cir. 2013); Video Gaming Techs., Inc. v.
Rogers Cty. Bd. of Tax Roll Corr., 475 P.3d 824 (Okla. 2019), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 24 (2020).
11
Mashantucket Pequot, 722 F.3d at 459-60; Video Gaming Techs., 475 P.3d at 827.
12
Mashantucket Pequot, 722 F.3d at 459-60; Video Gaming Techs., 475 P.3d at 827.
13
Mashantucket Pequot, 722 F.3d at 471-73; Video Gaming Techs., 475 P.3d at 830-31.
14
Video Gaming Techs., 475 P.3d at 834.
15
Mashantucket Pequot, 722 F.3d at 473-74.
16
Compare Mashantucket Pequot, 722 F.3d at 473-74, with Video Gaming Techs., 475 P.3d at 834.
17
Rogers Cty. Bd. of Tax Roll Corr. v. Video Gaming Techs., Inc., 141 S.Ct. 24, 24 (2020).
18
Id. (Thomas, J. dissenting).
19
Id. at 25.
20
Id.
21
See, e.g., Richard D. Pomp, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Indian Commerce Clause and State Taxation, 63 TAX
LAW. 897, 908-09 (2010); Alex Tallchief Skibine, Formalism and Judicial Supremacy in Federal Indian Law, 32
AM. INDIAN L. REV. 391, 420-21, (2008); Jesse K. Martin, Kansas v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation: Undermining
Indian Sovereignty Through State Taxation, 6 U. MD. L.J. RACE RELIG. GENDER & CLASS 251, 265-66 (2006);
Charley Carpenter, Preempting Indian Preemption: Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 39 CATH. U. L. REV.
639, 666-71 (1990); Erik M. Jensen, Taxation and Doing Business in Indian Country, 60 ME. L. REV. 1, 74-75
(2008).
22
See, e.g., Jensen, supra note 21, at 17-19 (proposing federal legislation to explicitly restrict states’ powers to tax
certain activities within tribal lands); Skibine, supra note 21, at 420-21 (criticizing congressional inaction and
10
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a legislative approach, this Article advocates that the judiciary maintain the Bracker framework.
We examine the current utility of the Bracker balancing test to determine whether courts are in
fact weighing tribal, federal, and state interests. We perform a statistical analysis of a dataset
comprised of 59 lower court taxation opinions which conducted a Bracker balancing analysis.
Specifically, we determine whether there are any factors that may explain why the majority of
lower courts rule against tribal interests.
First, this Article recounts the Supreme Court’s modern Indian law jurisprudence
governing states’ regulation of tribes, their members, and their lands. Although this Article focuses
on Bracker and its progeny, Bracker itself acknowledges that it fits within a broader progression
of the Court’s recognition of state authority related to tribal business operations. Justice Thurgood
Marshall’s opening line in the Bracker decision stated, “In this case we are once again called upon
to consider the extent of state authority over the activities of non-Indians engaged in commerce on
an Indian reservation.”23 To more fully consider the data set of 59 lower court opinions, we lay out
a brief outline of implied preemption in this context.
Second, we cross-tabulate the judicial finding of no preemption with key characteristics of
the cases in the dataset. We then present the results of regression analyses24 which we employed
to determine whether any factor explained why tribal interests lose tax challenges almost twothirds of the time. Contrary to expectations, there was no significant relationship between the
passage of time and preemption case outcomes. Our models revealed that lower courts were less
likely to find preemption of cigarette taxes but apt to find that state fuel taxes were preempted.
Third, we explore the inconsistent decisions rendered by lower courts in their application
of the Bracker balancing test. After identifying these incongruities in which courts render
conflicting decisions, we present ways in which the judiciary can revise and clarify the Bracker
balancing test in the hope of providing greater predictability and producing uniformity in the lower
courts.
II. DEVELOPMENT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS AFFECTING NON-INDIANS ON TRIBAL LANDS
This Part chronicles Supreme Court Indian law jurisprudence from Williams v. Lee25 in
1959 to Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation26 in 2005. Conflicts between states and tribes
significantly predate 1959.27 Three late nineteenth-century cases provide the context important to

emphasizing the problem of judicial supremacy); see also Michalyn Steele, Congressional Power and Sovereignty in
Indian Affairs, 2018 UTAH L. REV. 307, 337 (2018) (proposing an Indian Sovereignty Affirmation Act).
23
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 137 (1980).
24
Regression analysis is a statistical method used to describe the relationship between a dependent variable
(outcome variable) and one or more independent variables (predictive or explanatory variables).
25
358 U.S. 217 (1959).
26
546 U.S. 95, 110 (2005).
27
See e.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886) (“[Tribes] owe no allegiance to the states, and
receive from them no protection. Because of the local ill feeling, the people of the states where they are found are
often their deadliest enemies.”); see also Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: The
Judicial Divesture of Indian Tribal Authority over Non-Members, 109 YALE L.J. 1, 8-16 (1999).
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understanding the modern doctrine.28 Sometimes referred to as the “Non-Indian Lessee Cases,”29
the Supreme Court upheld state taxation of non-Indian property within an Indian reservation when
the state’s tax would not interfere with tribal treaty rights.30 But the modern doctrine blazed a trail
that is distinct from the early Non-Indian Lessee Cases.
A. The Pre-Bracker Legal Landscape
The Supreme Court’s modern jurisprudence begins with Williams v. Lee.31 In Williams, a
non-Indian operated a general store on the Navajo Indian Reservation and sold goods to a tribe
member on credit.32 Seeking to collect the amount owed, the store owner brought suit against the
tribe member in Arizona state court.33 The Supreme Court held:
There can be no doubt that to allow the exercise of state jurisdiction here would
undermine the authority of the tribal courts over Reservation affairs and hence
would infringe on the right of the Indians to govern themselves. It is immaterial
that [the store owner] is not an Indian. He was on the Reservation and the
transaction with an Indian took place there.34
The Williams Court stated, “Through conquest and treaties [Native American tribes] were
induced to give up complete independence and the right to go to war in exchange for federal
protection, aid, and grants of land.”35 Looking back to Chief Justice Marshall in 1832, the Court
recognized the independent communities of native nations, their ownership of distinct lands, and
their separation from the laws of the states where tribal lands are located.36 The essential question
regarding a state’s jurisdiction, absent Congressional authorization, “has always been whether the
state action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by
them.”37 Williams generated two lines of cases: (1) those related to tribal governance and taxing
authority and (2) those related to state authority.38 After we give a brief overview of tribal
governance as it relates to tribal taxing powers, we focus on the cases pertaining to state authority.39
28

Utah & N. Ry. Co. v. Fisher, 116 U.S. 28, 33 (1885); Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264, 274-75 (1898); Wagoner v.
Evans, 170 U.S. 588, 592-93(1898).
29
Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Town of Ledyard, 722 F.3d 457, 472 (2d Cir. 2013).
30
Utah & N. Ry. Co., 116 U.S. at 33; Thomas, 169 U.S. at 274-75; Wagoner, 170 U.S. at 592-93.
31
See Bethany R. Berger, Williams v. Lee and the Debate Over Indian Equality, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1463 (2011),
for a comprehensive examination of the case’s history.
32
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 217, (1959).
33
Id. at 218.
34
Id. at 222.
35
Id. at 218.
36
Id. at 219.
37
Id. at 220.
38
Matthew L. M. Fletcher, A Short History of Indian Law in the Supreme Court, 40 HUM. RTS. 3, 5 (2015).
39
See Alex Tallchief Skibine, Constitutionalism, Federal Common Law, and the Inherent Powers of Indian Tribes,
39 AM INDIAN L. REV. 77 (2014); Jensen, supra note 21, for a much more thorough examination. See Rebecca
Tsosie, Tribal Data Governance and Informational Privacy: Constructing “Indigenous Data Sovereignty,” 80
MONT. L. REV. 229 (2019), for an interesting look ahead into the digital era.
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1. Tribal Taxing Authority
Williams affirmed the principle of tribal governance authority. Tribes are domestic, dependent
sovereigns and retain their authority to govern. The tribal right to govern is aboriginal, not a
creation of the Constitution, and, in fact, predates the Constitution.40 Although tribes retain a
number of sovereign powers, like sovereign immunity and the power to exclude people from their
lands,41 tribal sovereignty is diminished in a variety of ways.42 Setting aside other limitations or
ambiguities regarding tribal authority, tribes clearly possess the power to tax members and
nonmembers on Indian land.43
Tribal taxing power is “an essential attribute of Indian sovereignty because it is a necessary
instrument of self-government and territorial management.”44 Taxation is an exercise of inherent
tribal governmental power that “derives from the tribe’s general authority, as sovereign, to control
economic activity within its jurisdiction, and to defray the cost of providing governmental services
[by requiring those acting within the territory to contribute].”45 Tribes can develop any type of
taxation scheme simply because taxation remains in their inherent sovereign powers.46 However,
the federal government, as the dominant sovereign, can modify tribal sovereign authority.47
2. Preemption of State Authority Relating to Tribes
More relevant for our purposes is the percolation of state taxation authority into tribal
affairs. Regarding state authority, Williams created the “infringement test,” which provided that
unless Congress has legislated to the contrary, state governments cannot infringe on the internal
affairs of tribal governance.48 Following Williams, the Supreme Court held that states may not tax
transactions on tribal land involving tribal members nor the on-reservation income of tribal
members.49 But a tribe’s off-reservation activity is subject to general taxation.50 Although the
infringement test remains an independent basis for the invalidation of state action, the Bracker
40

Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978).
Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 788 (2014) (sovereign immunity); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache
Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 136-37 (1982) (power to exclude people from Indian land).
42
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 209 (1978) (tribes lacked criminal jurisdiction over nonIndians) (quoting Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 572 (1823); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544
(1981) (creating the Montana test for limited tribal civil jurisdiction over non-Indians and the Montana test
exceptions).
43
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
44
Merrion, 455 U.S. at 137.
45
Id.
46
Jensen, supra note 21, at 23.
47
Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 435 (1989) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
48
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).
49
Warren Trading Post Co. v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965); McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax
Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
50
Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973).
41
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balancing test for implied preemption has mostly swallowed up any independent infringement
analysis when the issue involves non-Indians.
B. Foundations of Implied Preemption
Notwithstanding that it is often called the Bracker balancing test, implied preemption
analysis began fifteen years before Bracker with Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona State Tax
Commission.51
In Warren, Arizona imposed a two percent transaction privilege tax on a non-Indian who
was licensed by the federal government to conduct business on the Navajo Reservation.52 The
Supreme Court examined the history and level of federal regulations of Indian traders and noted
that the federal government largely allowed Indians to “govern themselves, free from state
interference.”53 The Court struck down the tax as an intrusion into federal licensing and regulation
of Indian traders on reservations and stated that Arizona had been relieved of any obligations to
the Navajo Reservation because the federal government provided roads, education, and other
services to the tribe.54 Simply put, federal regulation of Indian traders was pervasive, and Arizona
did not possess any duties or responsibilities that would justify the tax. 55 Following Warren
Trading Post, the Court decided a series of cases regarding retail cigarette taxes.
These retail cigarette cases require us to take a detour to examine the narrow subject of
state taxation authority related to tribes and Indians themselves. In Moe v. Confederated Salish
and Kootenai Tribes, the Supreme Court upheld the State of Montana’s retail tax on cigarettes sold
by an Indian on tribal lands.56 Although the legal incidence of Montana’s tax fell on the consumer,
the Indian seller collected the tax.57 The Supreme Court determined this collection requirement
did not interfere with either federal interests or tribal self-government and was a minimal burden
to collect a lawfully imposed tax.58 Thus, a state may impose a nondiscriminatory tax on nonIndian consumers of Indian sellers doing business on tribal land, even if that tax is detrimental to
the Indian seller’s business with non-Indians.59
The Court built on this principle a few years later in Washington v. Confederated Tribes of
Colville Indian Reservation (“Colville”).60 There, the State of Washington sought to collect retail
sales tax on cigarettes sold on tribal lands to non-tribal members.61 The tobacco sellers were

51

Warren Trading Post Co., 380 U.S. 685.
Id. at 685-86.
53
Warren Trading Post Co., 380 U.S. at 686-87.
54
Id. at 690-91.
55
Id. at 691.
56
Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S. 463, 482-83 (1976).
57
Id. at 482-83.
58
Id. at 482-83.
59
Moe, 425 U.S. at 482-83; Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 151
(1980).
60
Colville, 447 U.S. 134.
61
Id. at 141.
52
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federally licensed Indian traders and subject to tribal taxation of their cigarette sales. 62 Many of
the purchasers were “non-Indians – residents of nearby communities who journey to the
reservation especially to take advantage of the claimed tribal exemption from the state cigarette
and sales taxes.”63 In other words, “the Indian retailer’s business [was] to a substantial degree
dependent upon his tax-exempt status,” and the Indian retailer’s sales would fall sharply if the
retailer lost this tax-exempt status.64
As a result, the Court held that “the value marketed by the smokeshops . . . is not generated
on the reservations by activities in which the Tribes have a significant interest.”65 In Colville,
federal statutes did not preempt the state tax like in Warren Trading Post. Because Washington’s
taxation scheme did not interfere with tribal sovereignty and because the tribes were merely
marketing a tax exemption, the Court upheld the tax.66 In comparing the economic interests of the
tribes with Washington’s interest in raising revenues through their own taxation, the Court stated:
the [tribal] interest is strongest when the revenues are derived from value generated
on the reservation by activities involving the Tribes and when the taxpayer is the
recipient of tribal services. The State also has a legitimate governmental interest in
raising revenues, and that interest is likewise strongest when the tax is directed at
off-reservation value and when the taxpayer is the recipient of state services.67
Almost three weeks after the Court decided Colville, it issued Bracker.
In Bracker, the White Mountain Apache Tribe and Pinetop Logging Co., a non-Indian
business, filed for a refund of a motor carrier license tax and use fuel taxes paid for logging
activities conducted solely on tribal land.68 They argued that the taxes were preempted by federal
law, or, in the alternative, that the taxes unlawfully infringed on tribal self-governance. After
creating the Bracker balancing test, the Supreme Court held that these taxes were preempted by
federal law, and thus, improperly assessed.69
The Court initially clarified three principles of Indian law jurisprudence. First, the Court
stated that there are two independent, yet related barriers that will preclude a state’s taxation
authority: (1) the exercise of taxation authority is preempted by federal law and (2) the exercise of
taxation authority unlawfully infringes on the rights of tribal members on tribal lands “to make
their own laws and be ruled by them.”70 Either barrier can independently block a state’s taxation
authority regarding “activity undertaken on the reservation or by tribal members.”71 Yet, although
62

Id. at 144. The Indian Trader Statutes set for the requirements for a federally licensed Indian trader. 25 U.S.C. §§
261-264; see also Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Town of Ledyard, 722 F.3d 457, 467-69 (2d Cir. 2013).
63
Colville, 447 U.S. at 145.
64
Id. at 145.
65
Id. at 155.
66
Id. at 155-57.
67
Colville, 447 U.S. at 156-57. See also Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505
(1991).
68
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 137-38 (1980).
69
Id. at 152-53.
70
Id. at 142 (quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959)).
71
Id. at 143.
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principles of tribal self-governance are “deeply engrained in our jurisprudence,” tribal selfgovernance remains dependent on, and subject to, Congress.72
Second, the Court acknowledged that tribal sovereignty is distinct in form and substance
from state sovereignty, and as such, the typical federal preemption analysis is not relevant.73 Thus,
“[t]he tradition of Indian sovereignty over the reservation and tribal members must inform the
determination whether the exercise of state authority has been pre-empted by operation of federal
law.”74 As a result, courts consider the broad policies underlying tribal sovereignty, construe
ambiguities in federal law generously, and do not limit federal preemption in this context to
scenarios where Congress explicitly announced an intent to preempt state activity.75
Third, the Court limited this new balancing test to state assertions of authority “over the
conduct of non-Indians engaging in activity on the reservation.”76 It emphasized that the onreservation conduct of tribe members is generally immune from state taxation because a state’s
regulatory interest is likely minimal, and the federal interest in fostering tribal self-governance is
“at its strongest.”77
In finding federal preemption, the Court employed what is now known as the Bracker
balancing test. The Court’s formulation of this test stated in full:
More difficult questions arise where, as here, a State asserts authority over the
conduct of non-Indians engaging in activity on the reservation. In such cases we
have examined the language of the relevant federal treaties and statutes in terms of
both the broad policies that underlie them and the notions of sovereignty that have
developed from historical traditions of tribal independence. This inquiry is not
dependent on mechanical or absolute conceptions of state or tribal sovereignty, but
has called for a particularized inquiry into the nature of the state, federal, and tribal
interests at stake, an inquiry designed to determine whether, in the specific context,
the exercise of state authority would violate federal law.78
The Court held that federal regulation of harvesting timber on tribal lands was extensive,
stating that “the Bureau of Indian Affairs exercises literally daily supervision over the harvesting
and management of tribal timber.”79 Any state taxation interference would obstruct federal
policies, including the revitalization of tribal self-governance and tribal control of their own
business and economic affairs.80 “[E]qually important, [Arizona was] unable to identify any
regulatory function, or service performed . . . that would justify the assessment of taxes for
activities on Bureau and tribal roads with the reservation.”81
72

Id.
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 143-44.
76
Id. at 144-45.
77
Id. at 144.
78
White Mountain Apache Tribe, 448 U.S. at 144-45.
79
Id. at 145-47.
80
Id. at 148-49.
81
Id.
73
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Although the clear focus in Bracker was on the pervasiveness of federal regulation and
involvement in the timber operation, the Court, like in Warren Trading Post, emphasized the
complete lack of involvement of Arizona for the taxed activities, stating that a state’s general desire
to raise revenue was insufficient to justify the tax.82
Lastly, the Court seemed to give weight to undisputed fact that “the economic burden of
the asserted taxes will ultimately fall on the Tribe.”83 However, the Court couched this statement
with a footnote explaining that this fact alone did not result in preemption.84 Rather, Bracker rested
“on the pre-emptive effect of the comprehensive federal regulatory scheme.”85 Thus, Arizona’s
motor carrier license tax and use fuel taxes were preempted.86 The dissent argued that Arizona’s
“relatively trivial taxes” did not impose “an economic burden that would threaten to ‘obstruct
federal policies.’”87
82

Id. at 150.
Id. at 151.
84
Id. at 151 n.15. Footnote 15 states in full:
Of course, the fact that the economic burden of the tax falls on the Tribe does not by itself mean that
the tax is pre-empted, as Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976), makes clear. Our
decision today is based on the pre-emptive effect of the comprehensive federal regulatory scheme,
which, like that in Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm’n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965), leaves
no room for the additional burdens sought to be imposed by state law.
85
Id.
86
Id. at 152-53.
87
Id. at 157-59 (Stevens, J. dissenting). More fully, the dissent stated
Even assuming, however, that the state courts would uphold the imposition of taxes based
on the use of BIA roads, despite their similarities to private and tribal roads, I would not find those
taxes to be pre-empted by federal law. In Warren Trading Post v. Arizona Tax Comm’n, 380 U.S.
685, 85 S.Ct. 1242, 14 L.Ed.2d 165, the Court held that state taxation of a non-Indian doing business
with a tribe on the reservation was pre-empted because the taxes threatened to “disturb and
disarrange” a pervasive scheme of federal regulation and because there was no governmental interest
on the State’s part in imposing such a burden. See Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona State Tax
Comm’n, 448 U.S. 160, 168, 100 S.Ct. 2592, 2596, 65 L.Ed.2d 684 (Stewart, J., dissenting). In this
case we may assume, arguendo, that the second factor relied upon in Warren Trading Post is
present. As a result, Pinetop may well have a right to be free from taxation as a matter of due process
or equal protection. But I cannot agree that it has a right to be free from taxation because of its
business relationship with the petitioner Tribe. . . .
From a practical standpoint, the Court’s prediction of massive interference with federal
forest-management programs seems overdrawn, to say the least. The logging operations involved in
this case produced a profit of $1,508,713 for the Indian tribal enterprise in 1973. As noted above,
the maximum annual taxes Pinetop would be required to pay would be $5,000–$6,000 or less than
1% of the total annual profits. Given the State’s concession in this Court that the use of certain roads
should not have been taxed as a matter of state law, the actual taxes Pinetop would be required to
pay would probably be considerably less. It is difficult to believe that these relatively trivial taxes
could impose an economic burden that would threaten to “obstruct federal policies.”
Under these circumstances I find the Court’s reliance on the indirect financial burden
imposed on the Indian Tribe by state taxation of its contractors disturbing. As a general rule, a tax
is not invalid simply because a nonexempt taxpayer may be expected to pass all or part of the cost
of the tax through to a person who is exempt from tax. See United States v. Detroit, 355 U.S. 466,
469, 78 S.Ct. 474, 476, 2 L.Ed.2d 424, cf. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian
Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 100 S.Ct. 2069, 65 L.Ed.2d 10. In Warren Trading Post the Court found
an exception to this rule where Congress had chosen to regulate the relationship between an Indian
83
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Issued on the same day as Bracker, Justice Marshall also penned Central Machinery Co.
v. Arizona State Tax Commission.88 Arizona imposed a transaction privilege tax on business
conducted in the state, which was imposed on the seller.89 Central Machinery sold eleven farm
tractors to Gila River Farms, an enterprise of the Gila River Indian Tribe.90 Gila River Farms
operated on tribal and trust land on the Gila River Reservation.91 Central Machinery solicited the
sale, contracted, received payment, and delivered the tractors on the reservation.92 Further, Central
Machinery included the anticipated transaction privilege tax amount in its contract price.93
The Court determined that this case was similar to Warren Trading Post, with two
immaterial differences: (1) Central Machinery was not a federally-licensed Indian Trader and (2)
Central Machinery did not have a permanent place of business on the reservation.94 Because the
transaction occurred on the reservation, it was “plainly subject to federal regulation,” regardless
of whether Central Machinery was a licensed trader.95 Further, because the transaction fell within
the Indian Trader Statutes, federal law expressly preempted the state tax.96 Central Machinery’s
only reference to Bracker related to the relief of state burdens and responsibilities when a tribe is
left to conduct its affairs without state interference.97
In his dissent, Justice Stewart argued that the transaction did not fall within the Indian
Trader Statutes.98 Rather, Central Machinery was like any other corporation doing business in
Arizona, deriving benefits and services from the state at the taxpayer’s expense.99 As a result, the
dissent argued that the majority should have considered “the State’s valid governmental
justification for taxing the transaction.”100 Further, the majority should have inquired into “federal,
tribal and state interests, without which a rational accommodation of those interest is not
possible.”101 In other words, the dissent argued that there should have been a Bracker balancing
analysis, where presumably, the dissent would have upheld Arizona’s taxation authority.102

tribe and a non-Indian trader to such an extent that there was no room for the additional burden of
state taxation. In this case, since the state tax is unlikely to have a serious adverse impact on the
tribal business, I would not infer the same congressional intent to confer a tax immunity. Although
this may be an appropriate way in which to subsidize Indian industry and encourage Indian selfgovernment, I would require more explicit evidence of congressional intent than that relied on by
the Court today.
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Although Bracker was “in all relevant respects indistinguishable from Warren Trading Post,”103
Bracker created a new balancing test for implied preemption while leaving intact an avenue for
more traditional explicit preemption in cases like Warren Trading Post and Central Machinery.104
Just two years later, in Ramah Navajo School Board v. New Mexico, the Supreme Court
employed the Bracker balancing test to strike down New Mexico’s gross receipts tax on a nonIndian construction company that developed school facilities for the Ramah Navajo School
Board.105 The school board solicited funds from Congress for new school facilities, contracted
with the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) for the design and construction of the school, and
subcontracts were subject to BIA approval.106 Writing for the majority once again, Justice Marshall
stated, “This case is indistinguishable in all relevant respects from [Bracker.]”107 Federal
regulation of the construction and financing of tribal educational institutions was both
comprehensive and pervasive.108 Although the Court recognized that New Mexico had a regulatory
interest regarding the services it provided to the non-Indian contractor off the reservation, this
interest was “not a legitimate justification for a tax whose ultimate burden falls on the tribal
organization.”109 Thus, as recognized by Justice Rehnquist’s dissent, the majority gave
significance to the economic burden of the tribe in addition to the pervasiveness of federal
regulation—weight that was not explicitly given in Bracker itself.110
Neither Bracker nor Ramah provided specifics regarding the required considerations for
balancing state, federal, and tribal interests. And after the membership of the Supreme Court
changed during the 1980s, the Court strayed from Justice Marshall’s initial concept of implied
preemption.
In 1989, the Court once again considered the contours of the Bracker balancing test in
Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico.111 Under the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938, the
Jicarilla Apache Tribe had the authority to execute mineral leases. 112 The Tribe’s mineral leases
covered a substantial portion of its land and constituted the primary source of the Tribe’s
revenues.113 Cotton Petroleum was one of the Tribe’s non-Indian lessees, paying the Tribe
severance and privilege taxes which amounted to about six percent of Cotton Petroleum’s
revenue.114 Cotton Petroleum also paid five of New Mexico’s taxes, equal to about eight percent
of its revenue.115
103
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Cotton Petroleum was the sequel to Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe.116 In Merrion, the
Supreme Court affirmed the Tribe’s power to impose a severance tax on the production of oil and
gas by non-Indian lessees operating on the Tribe’s land.117 Cotton Petroleum addressed whether
New Mexico could also impose severance taxes on that same production of oil and gas.118
In Cotton Petroleum, the Court held that the New Mexico tax was not preempted.119 The
Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938 supported the concept of providing tribes with an additional
revenue source, but Congress had not intended to remove all barriers to maximized profits.120
Further, the Court discussed the repudiation of intergovernmental tax immunity in the first third
of the twentieth century, and states’ longstanding ability to tax oil and gas leases on public lands.121
Thus, the Court found that the Act neither expressly prohibited nor permitted state taxation of these
mineral leases.122
Turning to Bracker and Ramah, the Court found distinctions in the pervasiveness of federal
regulation of mineral leases.123 Here, New Mexico provided services to both the Tribe and Cotton
Petroleum.124 New Mexico’s services included regulating Cotton Petroleum’s wells located on the
reservation.125 The federal and tribal regulations were “extensive,” but these regulations were not
exclusive.126 And although Cotton Petroleum argued that the tax amount paid to New Mexico was
disproportionate to the services it received, the Court rejected the proportionality argument.127
The Court held:
We thus conclude that federal law, even when given the most generous
construction, does not pre-empt New Mexico’s oil and gas severance taxes. This is
not a case in which the State has had nothing to do with the on-reservation activity,
save tax it. Nor is this a case in which an unusually large state tax has imposed a
substantial burden on the Tribe. It is, of course, reasonable to infer that the New
Mexico taxes have at least a marginal effect on the demand for on-reservation
leases, the value to the Tribe of those leases, and the ability of the Tribe to increase
its tax rate. Any impairment to the federal policy favoring the exploitation of onreservation oil and gas resources by Indian tribes that might be caused by these
effects, however, is simply too indirect and too insubstantial to support Cotton’s
claim of pre-emption. To find pre-emption of state taxation in such indirect burdens
on this broad congressional purpose, absent some special factor such as those
present in Bracker and Ramah Navajo School Bd., would be to return to the pre1937 doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity. Any adverse effect on the
116
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Tribe’s finances caused by the taxation of a private party contracting with the Tribe
would be ground to strike the state tax. Absent more explicit guidance from
Congress, we decline to return to this long-discarded and thoroughly repudiated
doctrine.128
Additionally, the Court endorsed the multiple taxation of Cotton Petroleum by the Tribe
and New Mexico.129 Recognizing that three different governments had jurisdiction over Cotton
Petroleum’s wells that were located (1) on the Tribe’s land, (2) within New Mexico, and (3) within
the United States, the Court stated, “The federal sovereign has the undoubted power to prohibit
taxation of the Tribe’s lessees by the Tribe, by the State, or by both, but since it has not exercised
that power, concurrent taxing jurisdiction over all of Cotton’s on-reservation leases exists.”130 The
Court acknowledged that this concurrent jurisdiction could be detrimental to the Tribe, but held:
There is simply no evidence in the record that the tax has had an adverse effect on
the Tribe’s ability to attract oil and gas lessees. It is, of course, reasonable to infer
that the existence of the state tax imposes some limit on the profitability of Indian
oil and gas leases—just as it no doubt imposes a limit on the profitability of offreservation leasing arrangements—but that is precisely the same indirect burden
that we [previously] rejected as a basis for granting non-Indian contractors an
immunity from state taxation.131
Justice Blackmun’s dissent in Cotton Petroleum pointed out the majority’s alterations of
the Bracker balancing test. First, the majority’s approach allowed preemption only when a state is
“entirely excluded from a sphere of activity and provides no services to the Indians or to the lessees
they seek to tax.”132 This, according to the dissent, was inconsistent with a flexible balancing
test.133
Second, the dissent continued, “Under the majority analysis, insignificant state
expenditures, reflecting minimal state interests, are sufficient to support state interference with
significant federal and tribal interests.”134 This disregard for the proportionality of interests in a
balancing inquiry was antithetical to implied preemption.135
Third, the dissent criticized the approval of multiple taxation by the majority, which
minimized its adverse effects on the Tribe.136 A market can only bear a certain amount of taxation,
and inevitably, a state’s taxes will create a ceiling on tribal tax revenues.137 Because tribal taxation
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is essential to protecting tribal interests, multiple taxation is a threat to those tribal interests.138 The
dissent reasoned that the Court should necessarily consider the importance of the taxed activity of
the tribe, in addition to the size of the tax.139
But not all state taxation is subject to Bracker balancing. In Oklahoma Tax Commission v.
Chickasaw Nation, Oklahoma attempted to collect retail sales tax from the Chickasaw-owned gas
stations.140 The Court held, “The initial and frequently dispositive question in Indian tax cases,
therefore, is who bears the legal incidence of a tax.”141 When the legal incidence falls on a tribe or
its members for sales within Indian country, the tax cannot be imposed absent explicit
congressional authorization.142 If the legal incidence instead falls on a non-Indian, there is no
categorical bar to the tax, and the Bracker balancing test determines its validity.143 Thus, a
threshold question is on whom does the legal incidence of the tax fall. In Oklahoma’s taxation
scheme, the retailer of the fuel bore the legal incidence of the tax.144 As a result, Oklahoma could
not enforce the tax on tribal fuel retailers.145
Similarly, the most recent Supreme Court case related to implied preemption, Wagnon v.
Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, did not apply the Bracker balancing test.146 In Wagnon, Kansas
imposed a fuel tax on the receipt of fuel by distributors within the state. 147 Under this taxation
scheme, the fuel distributer, who delivered the gasoline to a Tribe-owned gas station, paid the tax
on its initial receipt of fuel and passed along the cost of the tax to the Tribe.148 The Tribe’s gas
station was adjacent to the Tribe’s multi-million dollar casino, in an otherwise remote and rural
area.
Before Wagnon arrived in the Supreme Court, the Tenth Circuit conducted a Bracker
balancing analysis and held that the tax was preempted because the value generated on the Tribe’s
land by the casino created the fuel market for the Tribe’s gas station.149 Thus, the appellate court
held that the Tribe’s interest outweighed the state’s general interest to raise revenues.150 But the
Supreme Court reversed.151 Because the legal incidence of the tax fell on the fuel distributor who
was operating off-reservation, the Court held that Bracker did not apply to the distributor’s offreservation fuel purchases that were then sold at the Tribe’s gas station.152 Accordingly, Wagnon
clarified a second threshold determination before a court conducts a Bracker balancing analysis.
In addition to determining whether the legal incidence falls on an Indian or non-Indian as set out
138
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in Chickasaw Nation, a court considers whether the challenged tax is assessed on or off tribal
land.153
The Supreme Court has not addressed the Bracker balancing test since 2005 in Wagnon.154
The intervening fifteen years have seen a variety of state and federal courts wrestling with Bracker
for a number of different taxes. Although the Supreme Court was given the opportunity to address
state and federal court applications of the Bracker balancing test in October 2020, the Court denied
certiorari.155
III. LOWER COURTS’ APPLICATION OF BRACKER
This Part examines a collection of lower court decisions citing Bracker that determined
whether state tax laws were preempted. We present the regression analysis models under which
we found a relationship between federal preemption and two categories of state taxes. Both models
demonstrated that courts were more likely to find that a cigarette tax was not preempted and less
likely to hold that a motor fuel tax was preempted. Our analyses also revealed the absence of any
significant association between federal preemption and other variables, such as the court system
in which the case was filed, the presence of a tribe in the litigation, the wealth of the tribe, and the
tribal law expertise of the attorney challenging the tax.
When we compiled this set of cases, we first identified all opinions in the Westlaw database
that cited Bracker during the period June 27, 1980 through June 27, 2020.156 We eliminated
decisions that did not concern challenges to state taxes. If a case was appealed to a higher court
and the higher court issued an opinion, we omitted the decision of the subordinate court even if
the higher court did not cite Bracker.157 When a court issued multiple decisions in the same matter,
we kept the final opinion and omitted the court’s earlier decisions in the same lawsuit. After
filtering out over 400 lower court decisions, 59 cases remained.158
We adjusted the database to account for situations in which one court ruled on challenges
directed against multiple unrelated taxes. As a result, we created three replica cases in instances in
153
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which two taxes were challenged159 and three replica cases when a court ruled on three taxes.160
After making these adjustments, the final number of cases in the dataset was 64.161 The complete
list of cases appears in Appendix A.
We examined each case to identify a variety of characteristics including date of decision,
level of court, jurisdiction, and types of businesses subject to tax. Table 1 displays a crosstabulation of the data on these characteristics in comparison to the court outcomes on the question
of Bracker preemption.
____________________________________________________________________________
TABLE 1. Cross-tabulation of Findings of No Preemption by Lower Court Case Characteristics
______________________________________________________________________________
No preemption

Total cases

% State prevailed

______________________________________________________________________________
Decade of decision
1980-89

8

17

47%

1990-99

10

15

67%

2000-09

8

13

62%

2010-19

14

18

78%

1

1

100%

7

10

70%

2020
Level of court
U.S. District Court

159

Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Stranburg, 799 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2015) (rental and utility taxes); Ute Mountain
Ute Tribe v. Rodriguez, 660 F.3d 1177 (10th Cir. 2011) (five taxes on the extraction of oil and gas); Maryboy v.
Utah State Tax Comm’n, 904 P.2d 662 (Utah 1995) (income tax claims by two different litigants); Eastern Band of
Cherokee Indians v. Lynch, 632 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1980) (income and personal property taxes).
160
Tulalip Tribes v. Washington, 349 F.Supp.3d 1046 (W.D. Wash. 2018) (retail sales & use; business &
occupation; and personal property).
161
Some cases involving multiple taxes were not cloned because the taxes were intertwined. See, e.g., Narragansett
Indian Tribe v. Rhode Island, 449 F.3d 16 (1st Cir. 2006) (en banc) (cigarette sale and excise taxes); Hoopa Valley
Tribe v. Nevins, 881 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1989) (timber yield and timber reserve fund taxes); Hoopa Valley Tribe v.
Nevins, 590 F. Supp. 198 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (timber yield and timber reserve fund taxes); Crow Tribe, 819 F.2d 895
(coal severance & gross proceeds from coal sales taxes); Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 650 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir.
1981), amended 665 F.2d 1390 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 916 (1982) (coal severance & gross proceeds from
coal sales taxes).
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U.S. Court of Appeals

16

28

57%

State intermediate court

10

13

77%

8

13

62%

Highest state court
Jurisdiction
Federal (district and appellate)
1st Circuit

1

1

100%

2nd Circuit

3

3

100%

4th Circuit

0

2

0%

8th Circuit

2

5

40%

9th Circuit

12

20

60%

10th Circuit

4

5

80%

11th Circuit

1

2

50%

All federal courts

23

38

61%

Alaska

2

2

100%

Arizona

5

6

83%

California

3

3

100%

Idaho

0

1

0%

Kansas

0

1

0%

Montana

1

1

100%

New Mexico

3

5

60%

Oklahoma

0

1

0%

Utah

1

3

33%

State (appellate and supreme)
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Washington

1

1

100%

Wisconsin

2

2

100%

18

26

69%

Education

0

4

0%

Personal residences (non-business)

0

1

0%

Timber /logging

1

3

33%

Gaming

2

5

40%

Hospitality

2

4

50%

Personal income taxed

3

6

50%

Mining

4

6

67%

Manufacturing/distribution

2

3

67%

Retail/wholesale

15

19

79%

Construction

5

6

83%

Retail/commercial leasing

6

6

100%

Legal services

1

1

100%

All state courts
Type of business

______________________________________________________________________________
Most of the data did not suggest a pattern explaining case outcomes. Even though some
jurisdictions rendered uniform rulings, there were an insufficient number of cases in those
jurisdictions from which to draw meaningful conclusions. Likewise, lower courts appeared to be
consistent in their preemption decisions concerning certain types of businesses. Again, the sample
size was too small to establish a pattern.
There did appear, however, that over time lower courts were less likely to find that a state
tax was preempted. This trend somewhat paralleled the decreasing success rates of advocates for
Indian interests at the United States Supreme Court. Several scholars have observed that tribal
interests’ win-loss rate have significantly dropped from the Burger Court years to the first decade
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of the Roberts Court era. Tribes lost 42% of their cases decided by the Burger Court, 162 did not
prevail in the Rehnquist Court 77% of the time,163 and lost 82% of the time during the first decade
of the Roberts Court.164
The pattern seemed to be true for rulings concerning federal preemption of state taxes. As
presented in Part II above, the Supreme Court’s post-Bracker decisions arguably weakened tribal
interests’ ability to prevail under the balancing test. Table 2 illustrates how the cases were
distributed in terms of two benchmarks, the dates on which the Supreme Court released its opinions
in Cotton Petroleum (04/25/1989) and Wagnon (12/06/2005).165 The table organizes cases into
three periods separated by these benchmarks.
________________________________________________________________________
TABLE 2. Findings of No Preemption by Benchmark Periods
______________________________________________________________________________
Benchmark period

No preemption

Total cases

% State prevailed

______________________________________________________________________________
Pre-Cotton Petroleum

8

16

50%

14

23

61%

19

25

76%

(06/20/1980-4/25/1989)
Post-Cotton/pre-Wagnon
(04/26/1989-12/06/2005)
Post-Wagnon
(12/07/1989-06/20/2020)
______________________________________________________________________________

David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court’s Pursuit of States’ Rights, Color-Blind Justice and
Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REV. 267, 280 (2001).
163
Id.
164
Bethany R. Berger, Hope for Indian Tribes in the U.S. Supreme Court?: Menominee, Nebraska v. Parker, Bryant,
Dollar General . . . and Beyond, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1901, 1901 (2017). For an interesting perspective on the
influences behind Indian law in the Supreme Court, see Grant Christensen, Judging Indian Law: What Factors
Influence Individual Justices’ Votes on Indian Law in the Modern Era, 43 U. TOL. L. REV. 267 (2012).
165
Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989); Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546
U.S. 95 (2005).
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A. Dependent and Principal Independent Variables
Based on the apparent pattern over time, we designed two models. The first model tested
the hypothesis that lower courts were more likely to find that a challenged state tax is not
preempted as the length of time transpiring after the Supreme Court decided Bracker increased.
The dependent variable for our first models was the case outcome on the issue of federal
preemption of the challenged tax, i.e., whether the challenged tax was preempted. The principal
independent variable of days after Bracker represented the number of days the lower court decision
was entered after June 20, 1980, when the Supreme Court published Bracker. Values range from
59 to 14,472.
The second model focused on outcomes entered in the three benchmarked periods
presented in Table 2. This model tested the hypothesis that lower courts were increasingly likely
to find that a challenged state tax was preempted after the Supreme Court entered a ruling that
limited tribal interests in its application of the Bracker balancing test. Using the same dependent
variable, the second model employed the principal independent variable of benchmark period.
Cases decided the day Cotton Petroleum was published or before are coded “1.” We labeled a case
“3” if the court issued the decision later than the day after the Supreme Court announced its
decision in Wagnon. The cases falling within these periods were coded “2.”
B. Explanatory Variables
We included six additional explanatory factors as control variables in both models to test
the relationship between the principal independent variable and the dependent variable. Federal
court was an independent control variable because tribal interests appeared to succeed more before
federal courts than in state courts (61% v. 69%). One possible explanation was that federal judges
were not subject to the political pressure that may have influenced their state counterparts.166 Some
state courts may have been less inclined to enter a ruling striking a source of revenue that indirectly
funded judicial operations.
Tribe in case was included because we expected that when a tribe participated in the
litigation, it was more likely to convince the court of the strength of its interest than if it did not
have a voice in the proceedings. A recent California appellate court reinforced this assumption.
The court stated, “Notably, the Tribe is not a party to this case” and found the state’s interest
outweighed federal and tribal interests.167 This variable denoted the presence of one or more tribes
in the case as either a party or amicus curiae.
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We did not investigate whether political pressure was exerted in the cases included in the dataset. We note that
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Tribal wealth measured the relative prosperity of the tribe whose interests were at stake in
the case. We hypothesized that wealthy tribes and their business partners were better equipped to
present their case than less affluent tribes and their associates.168 For this variable, we used the
median 1999 household income of the tribe as reported by the United States Census.169 When more
than one tribe participated in the case, we averaged the median income of each tribe. In the single
case in which the court did not identify tribes doing business with the non-tribal litigant, we
averaged the median household incomes for all of tribes in the dataset.170 This variable, admittedly,
is not an exact measure of affluence. For our analysis, however, it operated as a crude proxy of
relative wealth among tribes.
Attorney tribal law specialty was used to denote whether one of the attorneys, representing
a tribe or a party advancing tribal interests, possessed an expertise in American Indian law. We
used this label when attorneys or their firms represented themselves as specialists in this field.
Likewise, when the attorney represented different tribes in different cases, the attorney was
deemed a specialist.
The final two control variables are related to the type of tax at issue.171 Cigarette tax
denoted that the case involved a challenge to a state cigarette tax. Seventeen days before Bracker
was decided, the Supreme Court in Colville held that a state cigarette sales tax levied against onreservation purchases made by non-members of the tribe was valid.172 We hypothesized that lower
courts faced with a challenge to a cigarette tax would have found Colville dispositive and thus
would not have found that the tax was preempted under the Bracker balancing test.
Fuel tax was an explanatory variable denoting that the case concerned a challenge to a state
motor fuel tax (MFT). Fifteen years after the Court decided Bracker, it ruled in Chickasaw Nation
that a state could not apply its MFT to fuels sold by a tribe in Indian country.173 We anticipated

One scholar speculated that there “would have had a different outcome [in Mashantucket Pequot, 722 F.3d 457]
if the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe was much less financially impressive, or if the property tax had a greater impact
on the Tribe’s bottom line.” Edward A. Lowe, Comment, Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Town of Ledyard: The
Preemption of State Taxes Under Bracker, the Indian Trader Statutes, and the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 47
CONN L. REV. 197, 215 (2014). It is also noteworthy that some courts have referenced the wealth of the tribe when
conducting a Bracker balancing test analysis. E.g., Tulalip Tribes v. Washington, 349 F.Supp.3d 1046, 1048-49
(W.D. Wash. 2018) (“Tulalip is by all accounts in excellent financial health”).
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See, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, ECONOMICS & STATISTICS ADMINISTRATION, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
CHARACTERISTICS OF AMERICAN INDIANS AND ALASKAN NATIVES BY TRIBE AND LANGUAGE: 2000, 715-729.
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Appendix B.
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analysis.
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447 U.S. 134 (1980). Colville is one of three tribal tobacco case decided by the Court during the past fifty years
that upheld the challenged taxes. E.g., Dep’t of Taxation and Fin. v. Milheim Attea & Bros., Inc., 512 U.S. 61
(1994) (upholding New York statute imposing recordkeeping requirements and quantity limitations on cigarette
wholesalers who sell untaxed cigarettes to reservation Indians); Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of
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that lower court rulings on challenges to motor fuel taxes would follow Chickasaw Nation
concluding that the state was barred from applying its tax to tribes.
Tribal wealth was a continuous variable. The five other explanatory variables were binary,
coded “1” for the presence of the characteristic and “0” for its absence.
C. Results
There was no relationship between federal preemption and the primary independent
variables or for three of the five explanatory variables. Table 3 presents the analysis for both
models. Surprisingly, neither primary independent variable was significantly related to the case
outcome on the issue of federal preemption. Two control variables were associated with case
outcomes at statistically significant levels. For cigarette tax, the association was positive, and fuel
tax was negatively related to the finding of no preemption. There was no relationship between
preemption and the other control variables.
________________________________________________________________________
TABLE 3. Predictions of No Preemption Outcomes (N=64)
______________________________________________________________________________
Model 1

Model 2

______________________________________________________________________________
Days after Bracker decided

0.000
(0.000)

Three benchmark periods

0.064
(0.083)

Federal court

-0.017
(0.128)

-0.007
(0.129)

Tribe in case (party or amicus)

-0.069
(0.166)

-0.079
(0.168)

Tribal wealth

6.730
(9.257)

0.000
(9.83)

Attorney tribal law specialty

-0.023
(0.210)

-0.027
(0.216)

Cigarette tax

0.327*
(0.163)

0.341*
(0.165)
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Fuel tax

-0.484**
(0.191)

-0.479*
(0.193)

Constant

0.142
(0.303)

0.416
(0.307)

R2

0.257

0.249

Adjusted R2

0.164

0.155

Note: The top line of each entry indicates the coefficient from a linear regression predicting a
ruling of no preemption of tax. The parentheses in the second line of each entry contain the
corresponding standard errors. Asterisks: * p≤0.05 and ** p≤0.01.
D. Discussion of Results
There are several noteworthy findings of these analyses. Both models revealed that lower
courts adhere to the key Supreme Court decisions when the type of tax being challenged is the
same as the tax ruled upon by the Supreme Court. As we expected, lower courts were more likely
to find no preemption in cigarette cases, in harmony with Colville. Likewise, lower courts were
apt to find that fuel taxes were preempted, consistent with the holding of Chickasaw Nation.
Contrary to expectations, there was no significant relationship between the passage of time
or benchmark period and preemption case outcomes. To ferret out possible explanations, we took
a closer look at the decisions rendered in the cases. We discovered discrepancies in the manner in
which lower courts approached the Bracker balancing test. Some took state interests into account
but did not consider tribal interests in reaching their decisions.174 Others cited Bracker but did not
balance federal, tribal, and state interests.175
We also discovered inconsistent rulings on a number of issues. For instance, courts differed
as to whether a non-tribal party had standing to assert a tribe’s sovereign right to selfgovernment.176 Others disagreed regarding a tax’s economic effect on tribes and whether such
174

To determine whether this phenomenon affected our results, we substituted tribal interest for preemption
outcome as the dependent variable in both models and ran the tests. Again, there was no relationship between the
key independent variables with the dependent variable in either model.
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E.g., Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians v. Lynch, 632 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1980) (state taxing tribe for activities
occurring on reservation); Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A. v. Rev. Div. of Dep’t of Taxation and Rev.,
759 P.2d 186 (N.M. 1988) (tribal activity was beyond reservation boundaries thereby susceptible to state taxation);
Fatt v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 884 P.2d 1233 (Utah 1994) (individual Indian claimed exemption from income
tax); Maryboy v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 904 P.2d 662 (Utah 1995) (individual Indians claimed exemption from
income tax); Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Reservation v. Thurston Cty. Bd. of Equalization, 724 F.3d 1153 (9th
Cir. 2013) (property taxes on permanent improvements on non-reservation land owned by the United States and held
in trust for Indians).
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Compare Peabody Coal Co. v. Arizona, 761 P.2d 1094 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988) (finding that non-Indian coal
company had standing to raise tribe’s right of self-government) with Northern Border Pipeline Co. v. Montana, 772
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effect should have been taken into account in balancing interests.177 Decisions varied as to whether
federal leasing regulations or the Indian Trader Statutes and Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
(IGRA) created a strong interest in promoting tribal self-government and tribal self-sufficiency.178
The next Part examines these inconsistencies.
IV. LOWER COURT INCONSISTENCIES
In this Part, we consider divergent sets of decisions in the lower courts. As set forth in Part
III, aside from cigarette and retail fuel taxes, the application of the Bracker balancing test is
unpredictable. Justice Rehnquist in his Ramah dissent anticipated such variant outcomes.179 He
pointed to the contrasting levels of significance the Bracker and Ramah majorities gave to the
economic burden a challenged tax imposes on a tribe. The Bracker Court afforded minimal
weight,180 whereas the Ramah majority gave “paramount consideration” to the economic burden
on the tribe.181 Justice Rehnquist stated, “The general question presented by this case has occupied
the Court many times in the recent past, and seems destined to demand its attention over and over
again until the Court sees fit to articulate, and follow, a consistent and predictable rule of law.”182
The Supreme Court’s inconsistent application of the Bracker balancing test within the early years
of its formulation foretold of its discrepant treatment by the lower courts for the decades that
followed.
Ten years after Ramah, Justice Abrahamson of the Wisconsin Supreme Court echoed
Justice Rehnquist’s criticism, describing the Bracker balancing test as “uncertain guidance to state
and federal courts.”183 Most recently, Chief Justice Roberts described it as “a nebulous balancing
test,” which lacks rigidity and “mires state efforts to regulate on reservation lands in significant
uncertainty, guaranteeing that many efforts will be deemed permissible only after extensive

P.2d 829 (Mont. 1989) (finding that non-tribal pipeline company does not have standing to assert the tribes'
sovereign right of self-government).
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Compare Indian Country, U.S.A., Inc. v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 829 F.2d 967, 986 n.9 (10th Cir. 1987)
(“preemption analysis cannot turn on the severity of a direct economic burden on tribal revenues caused by the state
tax”) with Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Town of Ledyard, 722 F.3d 457 (2d Cir. 2013) (minimal economic effect
of tax on tribe is considered in balancing interests).
178
Compare Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Stranburg, 799 F.3d 1324, 1341 (11th Cir. 2015) (federal regulations
governing the leasing of Indian land sufficiently bring the federal interests within the scope of Bracker) with Herpel
v. County of Riverside, 258 Cal. Rptr. 3d 444 (App. 2020) (federal leasing regulations concerning Indian country
insufficient to outweigh state interests).
179
Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832, 847-48 (1982) (Rehnquist, J. dissenting).
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Id. at 853.
181
Id. at 848.
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Id. at 847.
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Anderson v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Rev., 484 N.W.2d 914, 923 (Wis. 1992) (Abrahamson, J. dissenting). See also
Judge Rosenbaum’s introduction in Seminole Tribe v. Stranburg, “Benjamin Franklin said, ‘[I]n this world nothing
can be said to be certain, except death and taxes.’ He was almost right. As this case illustrates, even taxes are not
certain when it comes to matters affecting Indian tribes.” 799 F.3d 1324, 1326 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Letter from
Benjamin Franklin to Jean–Baptiste Le Roy (Nov. 13, 1789), in 12 THE WORKS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 160, 161
(John Bigelow, ed., Federal ed.1904) (1888)).
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litigation, if at all.”184 Nearly forty years after Ramah, Justice Rehnquist’s prophecy rings true—
the Bracker analysis continues to spawn inconsistent outcomes. This Part examines three sets of
contradictory results in the lower courts: a non-Indian’s standing to assert tribal interests, the
weight afforded economic effect on tribes, and the preemptive force of specific federal
regulations.185
A. Non-Indian Standing to Assert Tribal Interest
The first set of divergent decisions involves the right of a non-Indian litigant to present
tribal interests in support of Bracker preemption. When setting forth the initial test in Bracker, the
Court held that there should be “a particularized inquiry into the nature of the state, federal, and
tribal interests at stake.”186 Perhaps because a tribe was a named party in the case, the Bracker
court did not address whether a non-Indian could assert tribal interests for this balancing test. But
tribes are not always parties in Bracker balancing cases. As a result, lower courts in different states
soon came to opposite conclusions on the issue of non-Indian party standing after the Court
decided Bracker.
In Peabody Coal Co. v. Arizona, the State of Arizona attempted to assess a number of taxes
on Peabody Coal Company, a non-Indian corporation, that mined coal on tribal lands.187 Peabody
challenged the taxes, arguing in part that the taxes were preempted under Bracker because the
taxes imposed burdens on the tribes and infringed on tribal sovereignty.188
The State of Arizona argued that Peabody lacked standing to claim interference with tribal
sovereignty.189 The Arizona Court of Appeals rejected the argument and determined that Peabody
had standing to assert tribal interests.190 It held, “Because the preemption issue cannot be
considered without also considering the tribal sovereignty issue Peabody, of necessity, must have
standing to raise the issue of interference of tribal sovereignty.”191 Washington and New Mexico
appellate courts have similarly rejected this type of standing challenge.192
The Montana Supreme Court took the opposite position in Northern Border Pipeline Co.
v. Montana.193 Northern Border, the non-Indian owner of a natural gas pipeline, contested property
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McGirt v. Oklahoma, 521 U.S. __, 140 S.Ct. 2452 (2020) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Roberts served as one of
Justice Rehnquist’s law clerks from 1980 until 1981. Bracker was handed down at the end of the prior term of the
Court, and Ramah was decided during the subsequent term.
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outcomes in the lower courts.
186
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 145 (1980).
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taxes assessed by the State of Montana on portions of the pipeline located on tribal lands. 194 Like
Peabody, Northern Border argued that the property tax was preempted under Bracker, in part
because the tax interfered with tribal self-governance.195 Montana argued that Norther Border
lacked standing to assert interference with tribal self-governance, and the Supreme Court of
Montana agreed.196 The court held that Northern Border, as a non-Indian corporation, could not
assert the interests of a tribe when the tribe is not a party to the suit.197 Subsequent Montana and
North Dakota supreme court decisions adopted the Northern Border Pipeline standing rationale
and denied non-Indian litigants the opportunity to present tribal interests.198
B. The Weight Afforded to Economic Effect on Tribes
Second, there is significant inconsistency among the courts as to the weight to be given to
the economic effect on tribes. This incongruence began at the Supreme Court level before it
emerged in lower court applications of the Bracker balancing test. Indeed, a close examination of
Bracker, Ramah, and Cotton Petroleum reveals the disparate positions the Supreme Court took as
to the importance of and emphasis on tribal economic burdens.199 In Bracker, the Court recognized
the economic burden but dismissed its relevance to a footnote.200 In contrast, the Ramah Court
relied on the economic burden as a preeminent part of its preemption analysis.201 But in Cotton
Petroleum, the Court dismissed the adverse economic effect of dual taxation and diminished value
of tribal leases as “too indirect and too insubstantial” to warrant preemption.202 With the Supreme
Court’s various approaches to the weight afforded the tribal economic burden, it is no surprise that
lower courts have charted different courses in the wake of uncertainty. Lower courts’ analyses of
the economic effect on tribes tend to be rather nuanced and typically manifest as varying degrees
of consideration. Lower courts choose from the variable Supreme Court precedent to best fit the
desired outcome while still adhering to the Bracker balancing test. Courts giving great weight to
tribal interests typically refer to Ramah, whereas courts generally rely on Cotton Petroleum when
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Id. at 835.
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Id. at 836.
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dismissing a tribe’s financial interests. A brief examination of five decisions illustrates the variable
approaches taken in the lower courts.
In Indian Country, U.S.A., Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, the State of Oklahoma
attempted to impose a sales tax on non-Indian consumers of the Creek Nation’s bingo enterprise.203
In balancing interests, the Tenth Circuit held that the tax was preempted, stating:
The imposition of a sales tax would burden the tribal enterprise by increasing the
total cost of playing bingo and by imposing collection, remittance, and record
keeping requirements. Although these burdens alone might not serve to displace
the tax, we believe they are relevant, when, as here, the state’s own interest in taxing
the on-reservation transaction is minimal.204
But at the same time, the Tenth Circuit, referencing Bracker and Ramah, noted that it did not read
Colville as creating a per se rule permitting taxation of Indian retailers and nonmember consumers;
it concluded that the “preemption analysis cannot turn on the severity of a direct economic burden
on tribal revenues caused by the state tax.”205 Thus, while rejecting the idea that tribal economic
burden alone could not tip the Bracker balancing test, the Tenth Circuit nonetheless concluded that
the tribal economic burden was “relevant.”206
In Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Town of Ledyard, the Second Circuit upheld a
municipality’s imposition of a personal property tax on the non-Indian lessors of slot machines
used at tribal casinos.207 Conducting a Bracker balancing test, the Second Circuit fully considered
the economic effect on the tribe.208 The Court compared the amount of the tax to amount of
revenues and contextualized the tax amount within the Tribe’s profitability of its slot machine
leases.209 Although the Second Circuit acknowledged that the tax was a “substantial sum,”210 it
found that the tribal economic burden was minimal.211 In doing so, the Court relied on the Supreme
Court’s holding in Cotton Petroleum.212 It distinguished Indian Country U.S.A. as within the
comprehensive regulation of gaming of IGRA, while the property tax that was at issue was not
within “IGRA’s pervasive reach.”213
In Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana, the State of Montana imposed severance and gross
proceeds taxes on coal mined from tribal lands by a non-Indian.214 The Ninth Circuit found that
the taxes were preempted.215 In balancing federal and tribal interests against state interests, the
203
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Ninth Circuit afforded great weight to an economic study finding that Montana’s taxes decreased
tribal coal production and prevented the tribe’s coal from competing with other coal producers.216
It also stated, “Coal production is vital to the economic development of the Crow Tribe.”217 Thus,
the Ninth Circuit held that the state was unable to overcome the heavy burden of showing that its
interests outweighed the Tribe’s economic interests and as a result, found the taxes were
preempted.218
Factually similar to Crow Tribe is Ute Mountain Ute Tribe v. Rodriguez. 219 The State of
New Mexico assessed several severance taxes on oil and gas extracted from the Ute Tribe’s land
by non-Indian lessees.220 The District Court found that, although the legal incidence of the taxes
was on the non-Indian lessees, the economic burden of the taxes rested with the Tribe.221 The Tenth
Circuit dismissed this economic consideration.222 Closely adhering to Cotton Petroleum, it stated
that “indirect economic burdens on the Tribe’s ability to increase its own taxes and attract new
leases” were not relevant to the Bracker balancing test.223 Thus, these economic burdens were not
proper justifications for preemption.224
In Tulalip Tribes v. Washington, the Tulalip Tribes developed a commercial retail center
which, along with the Tulalip Casino and Tulalip Resort, hosts retailers, restaurants, and an outlet
mall.225 This commercial center, bordering a major interstate highway, attracts thousands of nonIndian visitors and customers per day from outside the Tribe’s reservation.226 The State of
Washington and Snohomish County collected tens of millions of tax dollars from the non-Indian
retailers through an 8.9% sales tax.227 The Tribe challenged these taxes as impliedly preempted
and an infringement on its tribal sovereignty. Following the Cotton Petroleum line of cases, the
District Court disagreed and allowed the general state taxes of the non-Indian retailers within
Tulalip’s commercial center.228 In the District Court’s balancing, it considered the Tribe’s interests
in economic development, relied on a report from an expert, and stated that “Tulalip is by all
accounts in excellent financial health.”229
These decisions illustrate the varying degrees of consideration given to the tribal economic
burdens. From outright rejecting any tribal economic burden to carefully weighing and considering
economic evidence from experts, courts do not adhere to uniform standards. Even in factually
216
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similar cases, courts give different emphasis to the tribal economic burden. Because of the
inconsistent Supreme Court precedent, most lower courts have great discretion to decide the
appropriate weight to be afforded the financial burden imposed on tribes. Thus, tribes, tribal
business partners, and taxing bodies are faced with an unpredictable commercial environment.
Unfortunately, the divergence in cases involving factually similar scenarios is not confined merely
to the tribal economic burden.
C. The Preemptive Force of Specific Federal Regulations
Third, courts render inconsistent decisions concerning taxes on gaming and real estate
leasing. This is in contrast to cases involving challenges to taxes levied on tobacco sales or retail
fuel taxes. Lower courts consistently upheld cigarette taxes and held that retail fuel taxes are
preempted. These two patterns likely stem from Supreme Court precedent focused on both of these
categories of taxes.230 Unlike these areas of taxation, the Supreme Court has not considered
preemption challenges to taxes imposed on gaming or real estate leasing. Thus, the preemptive
force of federal regulations in these types of regulations remains unclear.231
1. Gaming
Frequently, lower courts address Indian gaming and IGRA. Congressional policies
underlying IGRA include promotion of tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong
tribal governments.232 IGRA expressly preempts the governance of gaming on tribal lands.233 At
the same time, IGRA grants states some role in the regulation of certain Indian gaming, requiring
Tribal-State compacts that regulate a tribe’s gaming activities.234 These compacts may include
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provisions regulating “subjects that directly related to the operation of gaming activities.”235
However, courts employ the Bracker balancing test when certain taxed activities are associated
with Indian gaming, but do not fall directly within IGRA and the resulting compacts.236
Mentioned above, the Second Circuit in Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Town of Ledyard
upheld the imposition of a personal property tax on the non-Indian lessors of slot machines used
at tribal casinos.237 The taxed activity fell outside of the activities regulated by IGRA. 238 After
balancing interests, the Second Circuit determined that the tax was not preempted. 239 The
Washington Court of Appeals came to a similar result with a business and occupational tax on
cash-access machine transactions executed on the floor of tribal casinos.240 Likewise, the Ninth
Circuit has held that a tax on a non-Indian construction contractor’s materials for a tribal casino
were outside IGRA and not preempted under Bracker.241
However, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma recently diverged from this line of cases. In
Video Gaming Technologies, Inc. v. Rogers County Board of Tax Roll Corrections, a non-Indian
corporation, Video Gaming Technologies (VGT), leased its electronic gaming equipment to a
Cherokee Nation business. 242 The Nation’s business owned and operated ten gaming facilities and
rented VGT’s gaming equipment and software at these facilities.243 Rogers County assessed ad
valorem taxes on business personal property within its borders, including the VGT gaming
equipment located at the Nation’s facilities.244 The Court acknowledged the similarity of these
facts to Mashantucket Pequot, but found unpersuasive its focus on ownership rather than the role
the equipment plays in gaming which is the activity comprehensively regulated under IGRA. The
Court held that the Bracker balancing test required preemption because of the threat posed to
federal policies underlying IGRA, the economic burden imposed on the Cherokee Nation, and the
County’s failure to justify the tax other than as a generalized interest in raising revenue.245
Similarly, the Eighth Circuit in Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe v. Noem, held that Bracker
preempted South Dakota’s taxes on casino amenities.246 The State of South Dakota imposed a use
tax on goods and services purchased by non-tribe members at the Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe’s
casino.247 The Eighth Circuit did not find that IGRA expressly preempted the taxation of nongaming purchases. Nonetheless, it held that the amenities significantly impacted the success of the
Tribe’s gaming operations.248 South Dakota’s taxation of these amenities would potentially reduce
235
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the Tribe’s revenues and go against IGRA’s policies.249 As a result, the Eighth Circuit held the
taxes to be preempted under the Bracker balancing test.250
2. Real Estate Leasing
Less often than gaming, lower courts resolve issues regarding state taxation of real estate
leasing. Section 5108 of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 authorizes the Secretary of Interior
to acquire interests within and outside of existing reservations “for the purpose of providing land
for Indians” and exempts this realty from state and local taxation.251 The Long-Term Leasing Act
grants Indian owners the right to lease any restricted Indian lands for business, residential, and
other delineated purposes with the approval of the Secretary of the Department of Interior. 252
Neither act exhibits an express intent to exclude state taxation. In accordance with the Long-Term
Leasing Act, the Department promulgated extensive regulations entailing all facets of leasing,
although they do not govern mineral leases (“the Leasing Regulations”).253
The courts in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Stranburg and Herpel v. County of Riverside
considered these federal enactments and regulations in their application of the Bracker balancing
test to determine whether state or local taxes on rental agreements were preempted.254 In Seminole
Tribe, the Tribe entered into long-term leases with non-Indian corporations to provide food
operations at its casinos.255 The State of Florida imposed a commercial rent tax on rents paid to
the Tribe by these non-Indian lessees. The tax was described as a tax on the privilege of engaging
in the business of renting real property in the state.256 The Eleventh Circuit found that federal
regulation of Indian land and leasing of Indian land was “extensive, exclusive, comprehensive,
and pervasive.”257 Even though the Tribe presented no economic impact evidence, the court found
that the regulatory scheme itself was a sufficient federal interest to outweigh the state’s generalized
interest in raising revenue that was not specifically linked to governmental services benefiting the
Tribe. Thus, the rental tax was preempted under the Bracker balancing test.258
Conversely in Herpel, the California Court of Appeals came to a different conclusion as to
a local possessory interest tax imposed on non-Indians who leased Indian Land within Riverside
County.259 Relying extensively on Cotton Petroleum, the Court of Appeals held that the nature of
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federal regulations was not strong enough to support preemption.260 In so holding, the California
Court of Appeals acknowledged that it strayed from Seminole Tribe and other decisions that
afforded great weight to the federal interest embodied in the scheme set up by the Leasing
Regulations.261 As in Seminole Tribe, there was no proof of the economic impact the tax had on
the Tribe. Thus, the tax was not preempted under the Bracker balancing test.
These decisions illustrate the disparity of lower court outcomes. In Montana and North
Dakota, non-Indians do not have standing to present one of the three components of the Bracker
balancing test.262 Whereas in Arizona and Washington, there is no question that a non-Indian
litigant may assert the tribal interest for Bracker balancing purposes.263 In the Ninth Circuit, courts
consider the tribal economic burden regarding non-Indian mineral and gas lessees.264 But the Tenth
Circuit does not extend the benefit of that same consideration to mineral and gas litigants.265 Taxes
on leased gaming equipment are preempted in Oklahoma, but upheld in the Second Circuit.266
From non-Indian standing to assert the tribal interest, to the depth of consideration of the tribal
economic burden, to conflicting decisions analyzing the same federal regulations, lower court
decisions present a labyrinth of inconsistency and unpredictability. In Part V, we propose how to
improve the Bracker balancing test to remedy the currently unworkable standard.
PART V: PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
In this Part, we recommend adjustments to the Bracker balancing test to resolve the lower
court discrepancies described in Part IV. Initially though, we acknowledge several extrajudicial
efforts and proposed solutions to lessen the unpredictability surrounding Bracker. Although some
suggested solutions simplify implied preemption or even act as a death knell to the Bracker
balancing test, we choose to work within the existing Bracker precedent to resolve the disparate
outcomes in the lower courts as we explain below. We suggest that courts should grant non-Indians
standing to assert tribal interests, consider the economic burden on tribes as a key component of
the tribal interest, and standardize the preemptive force of specific federal regulations.
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A. Potential Solutions Outside of Bracker
Forty years of lower courts’ application of the Bracker balancing test has produced some
unfavorable consequences for tribes. The negative impact of state taxation within tribal territory is
well-documented.267 Aside from the judicial unpredictability issue, the Supreme Court in Cotton
Petroleum acknowledged and endorsed dual taxation.268 The detrimental effect of dual taxation on
tribal economic development is well-established.269 Unsurprisingly, some tribes and states have
entered into taxation compacts to avoid litigating the Bracker balancing test. In addition to
compacts, scholars have proposed congressional fixes or abandoning Bracker altogether. Further,
the executive branch through the adoption of administrative regulations has attempted to put a
thumb on the scales of the Bracker balancing test without success. We briefly summarize each of
these concepts.270
1. Tribal-State Tax Compacts
The most successful alternative to litigating an implied preemption issue is the tribal-state
tax compact. Through this form of revenue-sharing agreement, the tribe and the governmental unit
voluntarily assign rights, delegate duties, and delineate authority to each party.271 The scope, detail,
and revenue proportions vary widely among compacts.272 Revenue-sharing agreements limit costly
267
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litigation, avoid dual taxation, and provide certainty.273 For example, the State of Montana has
entered into these agreements with seven reservation governments regarding the taxation of
alcohol, tobacco, fuel, and in one agreement, oil and natural gas production.274
However, tribal-state compacts are not without problems. Compacts may create
enforcement issues, be overly broad, lack necessary enabling authorities, or improperly conflict
with federal law.275 One party to the agreement often has unequal bargaining power.276 As a result,
tribes sometimes make major concessions to support negotiations, such as agreeing to an indefinite
waiver of sovereign immunity.277 Further, because courts are likely to uphold state taxation, states
may not be motivated to enter into a tax compact. Thus, a state may risk potential litigation because
of the likelihood of success in court. In contrast however, states have less bargaining power with
environmental regulation because state environmental laws are more likely to be preempted due
to the pervasiveness of federal regulation of tribal environmental issues.278 Thus, states have a
stronger incentive to enter a compact for environmental regulation than a revenue-sharing
agreement. Although tribal-state compacts vastly improve the prospects of predictable outcomes
and are frequently employed, litigation requiring a Bracker balancing analysis remains a prevalent
issue in state and federal courts. As a result, clarity regarding the Bracker balancing test is still
necessary.
2. Congressional Fix
Congress has plenary power over Indian tribes as well as over the states regarding Indian
affairs. The Supreme Court in Cotton Petroleum reiterated that the federal government wields
the “undoubted power to prohibit taxation” on tribal lands.280 As a result, an act of Congress could
prohibit states from exercising their taxing authority on Indian land. One solution is federal
legislation to explicitly restrict states’ powers to tax certain activities within tribal lands.281
Professor Erik Jensen suggests:
279
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Congress could exempt on-reservation transactions, and the parties participating in
those transactions, from federal taxation; it could provide that states have no power
to tax any person doing business in Indian country or any transaction occurring
there; it could take away the tribes’ otherwise sovereign power to impose taxes; it
could impose whatever regulatory restrictions on doing business that it thinks
appropriate; and so on. Congress thus could make Indian country more attractive
as a place for investment simply by clarifying the respective governments’ taxing
powers.282
But any congressional action is unlikely and subject to political pressures that would prevent this
type of tribal tax preemption.283 After all, congressional leaders are unlikely to choose tribal
interests over the interests of their state constituents.284
3. Executive Branch Efforts
Additionally, the executive branch has attempted to provide some certainty regarding
leasing on Indian land. The BIA has promulgated regulations that provide explicit preemptory
language to transactions involving leases of Indian land.285 25 C.F.R. § 167.017 provides:
The Federal statutes and regulations governing leasing on Indian lands (as well as
related statutes and regulations concerning business activities, including leases, by
Indian traders) occupy and preempt the field of Indian leasing. The Federal
statutory scheme for Indian leasing is comprehensive, and accordingly precludes
State taxation. In addition, the Federal regulatory scheme is pervasive and leaves
no room for State law.
This regulatory language was mentioned in Seminole Tribe v. Stranburg, but the Eleventh Circuit
stated that the Bracker balancing test requires a particularized factual inquiry and, as a result, the
court did not defer to BIA’s regulation regarding the Florida tax at issue.286 Federal circuits that
have addressed whether an agency’s preemption determination is entitled to Chevron deference
unanimously hold that they are not.287 Thus, the BIA’s regulatory attempts to clarify implied
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preemption in certain areas do not seem to effectuate any more certainty for the Bracker balancing
test.288
4. Abandoning Bracker, in Whole or in Part
Finally, scholars have recommended replacing the Bracker balancing test. Some suggest
reevaluating the Bracker balancing test’s role in federal Indian law.289 Others advocate abandoning
the Bracker balancing test altogether.290 For example, one scholar argues that the Supreme Court
should walk back its decision in Wagnon and apply the Bracker balancing test “irrespective of a
tax’s legal incidence and notwithstanding whether a tax arises as a result of on-reservation or offreservation activity.”291 Another contends that abandoning Bracker in favor of the Williams v. Lee
infringement test would be “a more administrable standard.”292 The infringement test, which is
rooted in the Territory Clause, allows state action only to the extent that the action does not infringe
on tribal self-governance. The infringement test continues to be an independent ground for
invalidating state action, regardless of the Bracker balancing test.293
However, recent cases like Bay Mills suggest that the Supreme Court is unlikely to abandon
Bracker any time soon.294 In Bay Mills, the Court was asked to reexamine tribal sovereign
immunity precedent set forth in Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751
(1998).295 The Court declined the invitation to stray from Kiowa’s precedent, holding that (1)
Kiowa came from a long line of precedent regarding tribal sovereign immunity, (2) the Supreme
Court has subsequently relied on Kiowa, (3) “tribes across the country, as well as entities and
individuals doing business with them, have for many years relied on Kiowa (along with its
forebears and progeny), negotiating their contracts and structuring their transactions against a
backdrop of tribal immunity,” and (4) Congress retains authority over tribal immunity and may
alter the law whenever it deems appropriate.296
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These four justifications for adhering to precedent clearly apply to the Bracker balancing
test. First, Bracker fits within a long line of precedent regarding state taxation on tribal land.
Second, the Supreme Court has relied on the Bracker balancing test for decades. Third, tribes,
states, and business entities consider the Bracker balancing test when contracting and conducting
their business on tribal lands. And fourth, Congress undoubtedly wields the power to permit or
restrict state taxation that is currently subject to a Bracker balancing analysis. Because the Supreme
Court is extremely unlikely to abandon the Bracker balancing test, courts will continue to work
within the Bracker framework.
Although some extrajudicial solutions work to avoid the uncertainty of the Bracker
balancing test and indeed have reaped mutually positive outcomes for tribes and the states,297 our
focus and ultimate recommendations remain rooted within the current iteration of implied
preemption under Bracker. Tribal-state compacts have limitations; Congress is unlikely to act; the
executive branch lacks the authority to declare its regulations preemptory; and the Supreme Court
is unlikely to abandon the Bracker balancing test. Accordingly, we provide suggestions for the
Bracker balancing test regarding the issues of standing, economic burden, and preemptive force
of specific federal regulations.
B. Standing
As set forth in Part IV, lower courts have diverged regarding the standing of a non-Indian
litigant to present tribal interests in support of a Bracker balancing analysis. Courts in Arizona,
Washington, and New Mexico have allowed non-Indians to present tribal interests for the Bracker
balancing test, while courts in Montana and North Dakota have not. 298 This issue was not before
the Supreme Court in Bracker because the White Mountain Apache Tribe was a party to the suit.299
To adequately conduct a Bracker balancing test, we argue that a non-Indian party must have
standing to assert tribal interests.
The Bracker balancing test requires a consideration of tribal interests when determining
whether state authority may encompass a non-Indian’s activity on tribal lands.300 The Bracker
court stated, “The tradition of Indian sovereignty over the reservation and tribal members must
297
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inform the determination whether the exercise of state authority has been pre-empted by operation
of federal law.”301 Courts are to consider the broad policies underlying tribal sovereignty. 302 As a
result, courts include tribal economic development and tribal sovereignty within this
consideration.303
The Bracker balancing test applies to a state assertion of authority over a non-Indian’s
actions on tribal lands. When a court conducts a Bracker balancing test, it should weigh all of the
competing factors at stake. Failing to take into account one third of the essential interests that a
court is required to consider is undoubtedly contrary to the test’s origin and purpose. Requiring a
tribe to become a litigant in order to permit another party to present the information necessary for
a court to conduct a full Bracker analysis imports an additional burdensome prerequisite for the
test. A complete analysis of the Bracker balancing test should not hinge on whether a tribe is a
party to the litigation. Thus, courts should hold that non-Indians have standing to assert tribal
interests for the purpose of the Bracker balancing test.
C. Economic Burden
Unlike non-Indian standing, the variability regarding tribal economic burden began with
the Supreme Court itself. Through Bracker, Ramah, and Cotton Petroleum, the Court has taken
divergent paths when conducting a Bracker balancing analysis.304 And because more recent
opinions do not disavow the reasoning of the previous ones, lower courts are presented with a
range of precedents from which to draw to resolve an implied preemption issue.305 Regardless, the
Court’s analysis in Cotton Petroleum supports the argument that tribal economic burden must be
considered in the Bracker balancing test.
We make two observations about Cotton Petroleum that support a full consideration of
tribal economic burden. First, the Court emphasized the factual findings of the New Mexico
District Court.306 The Court quoted the finding that “‘[n]o economic burden falls on the tribe by
virtue of the state taxes.’”307 The Court also stated that the tribe could increase its own taxes
without adversely affecting the development of its oil and gas production.308
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Second, the Court acknowledged the Ninth Circuit Crow Tribe decision, which it
summarily affirmed two years before Cotton Petroleum.309 There, the Ninth Circuit held that the
severance and gross proceeds taxes were preempted after affording great weight to an economic
study that found Montana’s taxes decreased tribal coal production, prevented the tribe’s coal from
competing with other coal producers, and harmed the tribe’s economic development.310 The Cotton
Petroleum Court distinguished Crow Tribe as “a case in which an unusually large state tax has
imposed a substantial burden on the Tribe.”311 The Court further noted that it would not reexamine
its summary affirmance of Crow Tribe, that the taxes in Crow Tribe had a negative effect on the
marketability of the coal, and according to the Tribe’s expert, the effective rate of the taxes were
32.9 percent.312 Thus, full consideration of the tribal economic burden comports with even the
least tribe-favorable precedence.
To thoroughly conduct a fact-specific balancing test under Bracker, courts must examine
the tribal economic burden. Cotton Petroleum acknowledges as much.313 When conducting this
particularized inquiry, courts must consider the broad policies underlying tribal sovereignty, which
includes tribal economic development.314 However, the Court in Cotton Petroleum also made clear
that tribal economic burden is not necessarily determinative. This reasoning is consistent with
footnote 15 in Bracker itself, noting that tribal economic burden alone will not determine
preemption.315 Such a result makes sense. Bracker implied preemption is, after all, a balancing
test.
But the Court in Cotton Petroleum limited what considerations are included within the
tribal economic burden.316 Some factors, like dual taxation and unsupported conceptions of lesser
profits, do not appear to be within the tribal economic burden consideration. 317 In Cotton
Petroleum, the Court stated, “There is simply no evidence in the record that the tax has had an
adverse effect on the Tribe’s ability to attract oil and gas lessees.”318 This suggests that part of the
tribal economic burden consideration includes whether a state tax adversely effects a tribe’s ability
to attract business enterprises. Further, the Cotton Petroleum Court’s discussion of Crow Tribe
suggests that the tribe’s ability to produce a good and the tribe’s ability to compete in the market
for that good are considered within the tribal economic burden.319 Thus, although the Court in
Cotton Petroleum and Ramah weighed the tribal economic burden, this consideration does not
necessarily encompass every negative consequence that state taxation has on a tribe.320
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Lastly, we note that courts should rely on economic expert testimony to determine the tribal
economic burden. The Supreme Court adopted this approach in Cotton Petroleum when it relied
on the district court’s factual findings regarding tribal economics that were based in large part on
expert testimony.321 Although many lower courts in their Bracker test analysis relied on expert
testimony in determining the tribal economic burden, some have afforded no weight to economic
expert opinions without explanation.322
D. The Preemptive Force of Specific Federal Regulations
The judiciary can reduce disparate outcomes in the application of the Bracker balancing
test if it changes the manner in which federal interests are considered in two respects. The first is
by standardizing the weight afforded to the federal interest when similar enterprises are being
taxed. The second is by adopting a rebuttable presumption against preemption when the area of
regulation is one in which the states have traditionally legislated.
Initially, we suggest a categorical standardized weight be assigned to the federal interest
because this interest does not vary as to similar categories of enterprises. This contrasts with tribal
and state interests which are likely to differ from case to case.323 The federal interest is defined by
its statutes, administrative regulations, and the manner in which the United States Government
administers these policies. Hence, for each category of Indian affairs supervised by the national
government, the federal interest at stake is static. Accordingly, there is justification to assign the
strength of the federal interest an equivalent weight in cases in which the state is attempting to tax
the same types of enterprises. In other words, courts should deem the weight of the federal interest
as a constant in the balancing equation when the same category of enterprise is the target of the
challenged tax.
In addition to standardizing the strength of the federal interest, we recommend that the
courts apply a presumption that is used to analyze preemption in the context of federalism. The
Supreme Court has promulgated the presumption that the state’s historic police powers are not to
be superseded by federal law when there is an historic presence of state law in a given area of
regulation.324 The incorporation of this principle into federal preemption analysis as to tribal
321
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and its members) with Ute Mountain Ute Tribe v. Rodriguez, 660 F.3d 1177 (10th Cir. 2011)(gave no weight to the
economic expert’s testimony—which had been adopted by the district court—that state taxes imposed an economic
burden on the tribe).
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The economic consequences of a tax on a tribe differs from project to project. Likewise, there is fluctuation
between cases as to the amount of revenue a state generates from the tax imposed on a business located on the
reservation. The cost of state services expended for the benefit of the tribe or its business partner varies, as well.
324
Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009). The Supreme Court appeared to have abandoned the presumption against
preemption before it decided Wyeth. See generally, Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J.
2085 (2000). It appears that the doctrine “is part of the landscape of preemption jurisprudence, perhaps now more
than at any time in recent memory.” Mary J. Davis, The New Presumption against Preemption, 61 HASTINGS L.J.
1217, 1254 (2009).
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interests provides a parsimonious lens through which to determine the strength of the federal
interest if a thorough examination of the statutory and regulatory scheme does not clearly
demonstrate that federal government’s policy is comprehensive and exclusive.
To illustrate how these principles apply to likely scenarios, we examine the federal interest
at stake in cases involving gaming enterprises operating on reservations. With the exception of
Nevada and possibly New Jersey, states historically have not exercised their regulatory power in
the realm of legal betting. Hence, the presumption against preemption would not apply. Congress
enacted IGRA to create the opportunity for tribes to develop gaming within their reservations.
IGRA recognizes a strong interest in promoting tribal self-government and tribal selfsufficiency.325 It is comprehensive even though it grants states some role in the regulation of certain
Indian gaming, requiring tribal-state compacts that regulate a tribe’s gaming activities.326 Although
the IGRA does not clearly define the exact scope of state regulations, as the Supreme Court
indicated in Cotton Petroleum, “ambiguities in federal law are, as a rule, resolved in favor of tribal
independence.”327 Thus, when the state attempts to impose a tax on gaming enterprises, the court
should view the federal interest as substantial. This in turn imposes the burden on the state to
demonstrate that it possesses an even stronger interest that is greater than the federal and tribal
interests. In gaming cases, the federal interest should uniformly be considered significant. 328
Leasing of tribal property provides another example of how the federal interest may be
characterized. The federal interest in tribal on-reservation leasing is defined by Section 5108 of
the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, the Long-Term Leasing Act, and the Leasing
Regulations.329 Although a reasonable argument can be proffered that the federal regulation of
Indian land and leasing of Indian land is extensive and comprehensive, the regulation of leaseholds
traditionally has been the subject of state regulation with little federal oversight. 330 The
presumption of preemption would apply. Accordingly, the litigant challenging the imposition of
the tax would have to overcome the presumption. The federal interest in this context thus should
not be given as much weight as the federal interest in gaming cases.331
VI. CONCLUSION
Forty years of applying the Bracker balancing test has produced inconsistent outcomes.
After examining lower court decisions that conducted a Bracker balancing test, we concluded that
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25 U.S.C. § 2702 (2010).
25 U.S.C. § 2710 (2010).
327
490 U.S. at 177.
328
Applying these principles in IGRA cases, the outcomes of Video Gaming Technologies, Inc and Flandreau
Santee Sioux Tribe v. Noem would remain the same, but the outcome of Mashantucket Pequot would differ.
329
25 U.S.C. § 5108; 25 U.S.C. §§ 415-416j; 25 C.F.R. §§ 162.001-703.
330
Except for civil rights and national emergencies, landlord-tenant law is governed by state statutes and the
common law rather than federal law. Cornell Law School, Legal Information Institute, Landlord-Tenant Law
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/landlord-tenant_law [https://perma.cc/S2L4-4SEP].
331
In the leasing cases, the application of these principles would produce the same outcome in Stranburg and the
opposite result in Herpel.
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the test fails to provide clear guidance of its application. Our statistical analysis did not reveal any
factors guiding lower court decisions, save for the two areas of law on which the Supreme Court
has clearly ruled: cigarette and retail fuel taxes. To encourage lower courts to increase consistency,
we suggested three ways to produce more predictable outcomes: (1) non-Indian litigants should
have standing to argue the tribal interest prong, (2) courts should consider the tribal economic
burden as presented through expert testimony, and (3) courts should standardize the weight
afforded to the federal interest when the similar enterprises are being taxed and adopt a rebuttable
presumption against preemption when the area of regulation is one in which the states have
traditionally legislated.
In May 2020, the United States Supreme Court denied a petition for writ of certiorari filed
in Noem v. Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe thereby declining the opportunity to reevaluate the
Bracker balancing test in the context of taxation of gaming on tribal lands.332 In July 2020, Chief
Justice Roberts criticized Bracker in his dissent in McGirt v. Oklahoma, recognizing the test’s
uncertainty and the resulting litigious consequences.333 Compounding Chief Justice Roberts’s
McGirt dissent was the October 2020 denial of certiorari for the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s Video
Gaming Technologies decision.334 The opposite holdings of the Oklahoma Supreme Court and the
Second Circuit in nearly identical factual situations presented a straightforward opportunity to
clarify the Bracker balancing test.335 But with the denial of certiorari, Justice Thomas correctly
concluded that “pre-emption law will remain amorphous.”336 Unless the Supreme Court grants
certiorari of a case applying the Bracker balancing test, lower courts will continue to inconsistently
apply this currently unworkable test to the detriment of states, tribes, and interested third parties.
Until then, the Bracker balancing test for implied preemption will continue to fall short as a
predictable judicial resolution for state taxation in Indian lands.
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Noem v. Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe, 140 S.Ct. 2804 (2020). See also Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Factbound and
Splitless: The Certiorari Process as Barrier to Justice for Indian Tribes, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 933 (2009). Although the
case presented an opportunity to clarify certain aspects of the Bracker balancing test, the Flandreau Santee Sioux
Tribe welcomed the denial. Securing Victory for Tribes in Landmark Tax Case, PEEBLES KIDDER (May 27, 2020),
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McGirt v. Oklahoma, 521 U.S. __, 140 S.Ct. 2452 (2020) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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Rogers Cty. Bd. v. Video Gaming Techs., Inc., 141 S.Ct. 24, 24 (2020).
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Id. at 24-25 (Thomas, J. dissenting).
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APPENDIX A. Dataset - 64 Cases*
*Duplicate cases are labeled A and B, and the triplicate set of cases is labeled A, B, and C.
______________________________________________________________________________
Date
08/25/1980

10/10/1980
10/10/1980
07/13/1981

06/16/1983

07/6/1984

09/5/1984
01/24/1986
09/26/1986
06/11/1987

07/31/1987
09/17/1987
09/22/1987
05/10/1988

Case Name & Citation
Mescalero Apache Tribe v. O’Cheskey, 625 F.2d
967 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 959
(1982)
A: Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians v. Lynch,
632 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1980)
B: Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians v. Lynch,
632 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1980)
Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 650 F.2d 1104
(9th Cir. 1981) (Crow I), amended 665 F.2d 1390
(1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 916 (1982)
Board of Equalization v. Alaska Native Bhd. and
Sisterhood, Camp No. 14, 666 P.2d 1015 (Alaska
1983)
Hoopa Valley Tribe v. Nevins, 590 F. Supp. 198
(N.D. Cal. 1984)
Marty Indian Sch. v. South Dakota, 592 F. Supp.
1236 (D. S.D. 1984)
Sqauxin Island Tribe v. Washington, 781 F.2d
715 (9th Cir. 1986)
Chemehuevi Indian Tribe v. California State Bd.,
800 F.2d 1446 (9th Cir. 1986)
Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 819 F.2d 895
(9th Cir. 1987) (Crow II) summarily aff'd 484
U.S. 997 (1988)
Marty Indian Sch. Bd., Inc. v. South Dakota, 824
F.2d 684 (8th Cir. 1987)
Cotton Petroleum v. New Mexico, 106 N.M. 517
(App. 1987)
Indian Country, U.S.A., Inc. v. Okla. Tax
Comm’n, 829 F.2d 967 (10th Cir. 1987)
Peabody Coal Co. v. Arizona, 761 P.2d 1094
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1988)
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Tax

Outcome

gross receipts

not
preempted

income

preempted

personal
property
coal
severance &
gross
proceeds
ad valorem

preempted

timber yield
& timber
reserve fund
sales

preempted

liquor sales

not
preempted
not
preempted
preempted

cigarette
coal
severance &
gross
proceeds
fuel (MFT)
oil & gas

preempted

not
preempted

preempted

preempted

sales

not
preempted
preempted

transaction
privilege

not
preempted

08/10/1988

04/20/1989
07/28/1989

Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A. v.
Revenue Div. of Dep’t of Taxation and Revenue,
759 P.2d 186 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988)
Northern Border Pipeline Co. v. Montana, 772
P.2d 829 (Mont. 1989)
Hoopa Valley Tribe v. Nevins, 881 F.2d 657 (9th
Cir. 1989)

09/24/1991

Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue v. Dillon, 826 P.2d 1186
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1991)

06/23/1992

Anderson v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Revenue, 484
N.W.2d 914 (Wis. 1992)
Gila River Indian Cmty. v. Waddell, 967 F.2d
1404 (9th Cir. 1992) (Gila River II)
Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., Inc. v. Bureau of
Revenue, 729 P.2d 1243 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986)
Blaze Const. Co., Inc. v. Taxation and Revenue
Dep’t, 884 P.2d 803 (N.M. 1994)
Fatt v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 884 P.2d 1233
(Utah 1994)
Arizona Dep’t of Revenue v. M. Greenberg
Const., 897 P.2d 699 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995)
Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Cmty. v.
Arizona, 50 F.3d 734 (9th Cir. 1995)
A Maryboy v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 904 P.2d
662 (Utah 1995)
B Maryboy v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 904 P.2d
662 (Utah 1995)
Gila River Indian Cmty. v. Waddell, 91 F.3d
1232 (9th Cir. 1996) (Gila River I)
Pimalco, Inc. v. Maricopa Cty., 937 P.2d 1198
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1997)
Yavapai-Prescott Indian Tribe v. Scott, 117 F.3d
1107 (9th Cir. 1997)

06/26/1992
10/6/1992
10/18/1994
10/27/1994
01/5/1995
03/21/1995
09/14/1995
09/14/1995
07/31/1996
01/9/1997
06/30/1997

01/22/1998
03/4/1999

05/30/2000
02/13/2001

Loveness v. Ariz. Dep’t of Rev., 963 P.2d 303
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1998)
Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., Inc. v. New Mexico
Taxation & Revenue Dep’t, 977 P.2d 1021 (N.M.
Ct. App. 1999)
Sac and Fox Nation v. Pierce, 213 F.3d 566 (10th
Cir. 2000)
LaRock v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Revenue, 621
N.W.2d 907 (Wis. 2001)
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gross receipts

not
preempted

ad valorem
(property)
timber yield
& timber
reserve fund
luxury
privilege
(tobacco)
income

not
preempted
preempted

transaction
privilege
gross receipts
gross receipts
income
contracting
privilege
sales
income
income
sales
possessory
interest
business
transaction
privilege
individual
income
gasoline

fuel
income

not
preempted
not
preempted
preempted
preempted
not
preempted
preempted
not
preempted
not
preempted
preempted
not
preempted
not
preempted
not
preempted
not
preempted
not
preempted
preempted

not
preempted
not
preempted

06/8/2001
08/14/2003
08/15/2003
02/27/2004
08/19/2004
02/3/2006
05/24/2006
02/5/2007
6/18/2008
01/4/2010

10/14/2010
05/9/2011
07/27/2011
02/28/2012
07/15/2013

07/30/2013

08/26/2015
08/26/2015
09/28/2017
10/4/2018
10/4/2018

Goodman Oil Co. v. Idaho State Tax Comm’n, 28
fuel
P.3d 996 (Idaho 2001)
Luther Const. Co., Inc. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Rev., 74
transaction
P.3d 276 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003)
privilege
Ketchikan Gateway Borough v. Ketchikan Indian
ad valorem
Corp., 75 P.3d 1042 (Alaska 2003)
Omaha Tribe v. Miller, 311 F. Supp. 2d 816 (S.D.
tobacco
Iowa 2004)
escrow fund
Coeur D’Alene Tribe v. Hammond, 384 F.3d 674
fuel (MFT)
(9th Cir. 2004)
Squaxin Island Tribe v. Stephens, 2006 WL
motor vehicle
278559 (W.D. Wash. 2006)
excise
Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Rhode Island, 449
cigarette sales
F.3d 16 (1st Cir. 2006) (en banc)
& excise
Winnebago Tribe v. Kline, 150 P.3d 892 (Kan.
fuel (MFT)
2007)
Barona Band of Mission Indians v. Yee, 528 F.3d
sales
1184 (9th Cir. 2008)
Confederated Tribes and Band of the Yakama
cigarette tax
Nation v. Gregoire, 680 F.Supp.2d 1258 (E.D.
Wash. 2010)
Seneca Nation of Indians v. Paterson, 2010 WL
cigarette sales
4027796 (W.D. N.Y. 2010)
Oneida Nation v. Cuomo, 645 F.3d 154 (2d Cir.
cigarette sales
2011)
Ute Mountain Ute Tribe v. Rodriguez, 660 F.3d
oil & gas
1177 (10th Cir. 2011)
severance
Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Pruitt, 669 F.3d
tobacco
1159 (10th Cir. 2012)
excise
Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Town of Ledyard,
ad valorem
722 F.3d 457 (2d Cir. 2013)
(personal
property)
Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Reservation v.
ad valorem
Thurston County Bd. of Equalization, 724 F.3d
(property)
1153 (9th Cir. 2013)
A Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Stranburg, 799
rental
F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2015)
B Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Stranburg, 799
utility
F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2015)
People ex rel. Becerra v. Rose, 16 Cal. App. 5th
cigarette
317 (2017)
excise
A Tulalip Tribes v. Washington, 349 F.Supp.3d
retail sales &
1046 (W.D. Wash. 2018)
use
B Tulalip Tribes v. Washington, 349 F.Supp.3d
business &
1046 (W.D. Wash. 2018)
occupation
378

preempted
preempted
not
preempted
not
preempted
preempted
preempted
not
preempted
preempted
not
preempted
not
preempted
not
preempted
not
preempted
not
preempted
not
preempted
not
preempted
preempted

preempted
not
preempted
not
preempted
not
preempted
not
preempted

10/4/2018
12/11/2018
01/28/2019

02/25/2019
08/13/2019
09/6/2019
09/6/2019
12/17/2019
02/10/2020

C Tulalip Tribes v. Washington, 349 F.Supp.3d
1046 (W.D. Wash. 2018)
Everi Payments, Inc. v. Wash. State Dep’t of
Rev., 432 P.3d 411 (Wash. Ct. App. 2018)
Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v.
Riverside County, 749 Fed. App. 650 (9th Cir.
2019)
People ex. rel. Becerra v. Huber, 32 Cal. App. 5th
524 (2019)
Big Sandy Rancheria Enterprises v. Becerra, 395
F.Supp.3d 1314 (E.D. California)
Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe v. Haeder, 938
F.3d 941 (8th Cir. 2019)
Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe v. Noem, 938 F.3d
928 (8th Cir. 2019)
Video Gaming Techs., Inc. v. Rogers Cty. Bd. of
Tax Roll Corr., 475 P.3d 824 (Okla. 2019)
Herpel v. County of Riverside, 258 Cal. Rptr. 3d
444 (App. 2020)
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personal
property
business &
occupational
possessory
interest

not
preempted
not
preempted
not
preempted

cigarette
excise
cigarette
excise
gross receipts

not
preempted
not
preempted
not
preempted
preempted

use
ad valorem
(equipment)
possessory
interest

preempted
not
preempted
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APPENDIX B. Median 1999 Household Income for Tribes in 64 Case Dataset
______________________________________________________________________________
Tribes in each case

Median 2000 household income

______________________________________________________________________________
Mashantucket Pequot

$60,132

Agua Caliente

$41,131

Flandreau Santee Sioux

$37,500

Chemehuevi

$35,750

Squaxin Island

$35,750

Squaxin Island & Swinomish

$35,732

Menominee & Oneida

$33,886

Yavapai-Prescott

$33,750

Oneida of New York, Seneca Nation, Unkechauge, & Mohawk

$32,859

Coeur d'Alene

$32,847

Tulalip Tribes

$32,045

Puyallup Tribe of Washington

$31,728

Chehalis

$31,250

Seneca Nation & Cayuga

$30,572

Salt River Pima-Maricopa

$30,450

Yakama

$30,338

Seminole Tribe

$30,313

Lake Superior Chippewa

$30,234
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Coeur D’Alene, Nez Perce, & Shoshone-Bannock

$29,366

Sac & Fox, Iowa, & Kickapoo

$29,167

Cherokee Nation

$28,791

Cherokee

$28,658

Hoopa Valley Tribe

$28,657

Muscogee Creek

$28,390

Unknown (average of medians)

$28,502

Mission

$27,885

Ketchikan

$27,768

Jicarilla Apache, Navajo, Laguna Pueblo, & Zia Pueblo

$27,572

Navajo (Utah)

$26,787

Jicarilla Apache

$26,667

Gila River

$26,339

Crow

$25,344

Alturas Indian Ranchera & Karuk

$25,016

Wiyot Band of Indians

$24,910

Western Mono

$24,750

Navajo (Arizona) & Hoppi

$24,433

Navajo (Arizona)

$22,647

Mescalero

$22,447

Navajo (New Mexico)

$21,830

Winnebago of Nebraska

$21,705

Assiniboine & Sioux

$21,448
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Omaha

$20,893

Yankton Sioux

$20,409

Ute Mountain

$19,390

White Mountain Apache

$17,227

Narragansett

$16,094
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